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This thesis presents the prototype of an econometric
model designed to simulate the effects of alternative aid
formulas on expenditure by local school districts. Such
a model is more useful than the purely qualitative models
of economic theory. It is also more useful than previous
econometric models, because it takes explicit account of
how local expenditures are affected by the form of inter-
governmental grants.
The Introduction explains the nature of the model in
nontechnical terms. The two essential concepts are the
opportunity frontier and the preference function. The
opportunity frontier shows how much expenditure per pupil
a school district can obtain by levying any particular
school tax rate. The frontier is determined by the amount
of local tax base per pupil and by the state and federal
aid formulas. The preference function, on the other hand,
indicates the local school board's willingness to raise
the local school tax rate for the sake of more expenditure
per pupil. The object of the econometric model is to mea-
sure how the local willingness to tax and spend depends on
the characteristics of the population in the district.
Socioeconomic status was found to be the main determinant.
This implies that, even if every district faced the same
opportunity frontier, higher-class districts would choose
to tax and spend more for schools. Accordingly, simulation
of a pure "percentage equalizing" formula in Massachusetts
indicated that wide, wealth- related disparities would persist.
The model and simulation are presented in Chapters
IV and V. Chapter I argues why reducing disparities in
expenditure per pupil is worth doing in the first place,
and Chapter II reviews the rationale of existing and proposed
state aid formulas. At the end, Chapter VI discusses how
simulation might be used in finding an optimal state aid
formula, and suggests generalizing the ideas about state
school aid to subsidy programs in general.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter Temin
Title: Associate Professor of Economics
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Recent court decisions in several states have elec-
trified the issue of school finance. The courts have
ruled that the present method of using the local property
tax to pay for public schools is unconstitutional because
it makes the level of spending in a school district depend
on the wealth of that district. (1) If these rulings
stand, the states will have to change their methods of financ-
ing public schools.
To satisfy the courts, the states may simply assume
the full burden of supporting local schools. (2) Or instead
they may preserve the local school district as an autonomous
fiscal unit, but' find more equalizing formulas for distri-
buting state aid to the districts. Politically, the latter
solution seems more likely. If so, it would be important
to know what pattern of expenditure per pupil would result
from any particular new aid formula. Although the courts
may judge only the process of raising money for schools,
arguments over the intrinsic fairness of various formulas
are confusing to the average person. For public discussion
and legislative choice, it would therefore be useful to
predict the results of alternative formulas.
This paper presents an econometric technique for
making such a prediction. The model simulates the distri-
bution of expenditure per pupil among school districts
that would result from any given aid formula, taking into
account the change in the amount of revenue raised locally.
This prediction, while obviously not perfect, is better
than a forecast which ignores this change in expenditure
from local sources.
The simulation model employs two basic concepts:
the opportunity frontier and the preference function.
These may be explained in nontechnical terms as follows.
The opportunity frontier is a relationship between
the local tax rate and the level of expenditure per pupil
in a school district. Given the local tax base and the
amount of state and federal aid, any particular local tax
rate will determine the amount of expenditure per pupil.
The opportunity frontier thus represents the level of
expenditure the local school board would be able to get by
levying a given local tax rate.
At the same time, a school board's willingness
to incur higher tax rates for the sake of higher spending
is expressed by its preference function. Every school
board of course would wish to spend more and tax less.
But the opportunity frontier constrains the possibilities,
so that spending more entails taxing more. The preference
function identifies the most preferred combination of taxes
and expenditure out of all the possible combinations on
the opportunity frontier. At very low levels of taxes and
expenditure, most school boards would want to raise the local
tax rate in order to get more spending. At very high tax
rates, however, most school boards would be willing to
cut expenditures in order to reduce the tax rate. Somewhere
in the middle each school board finds the point on its
frontier that it likes best. At this point raising the tax
rate would not be felt to yield enough additional expenditure,
but reducing the tax rate would lose too much. Thus pre-
ferences and possibilities interact to determine the level
of expenditure and the local tax rate.
Wealthy school districts spend more money per pupil
because they have both a more favorable opportunity frontier
and a stronger preference for spending on schools. The
more favorable opportunities are simply due to a larger
local tax base, which yields more money per pupil from a
given tax rate. The stronger propensity to tax for the
sake of schools is a completely separate thing. It has to
do with the tastes of people in the school district. For
example, if two di stricts have equal total wealth (taxable
propertT) , but one district is inhabited by ten elderly
households on social security plus ten working-class
families with one child each, while the second district
contains ten upper-middle-class families with one child
each, then it is likely that the second community will
spend more money per pupil than the first, even though it
must levy a higher property tax rate in order to do so.
In fact, a main finding of the empirical model is that a
strong preference for school spending is characteristic of
well-educated, professional, upper-middicle-class people,
who also tend to have higher than average income and wealth.
Therefore wealth and income would still correlate with higher
expenditure, even if state aid succeeded in neutralizing
differences between school districts in sheer fiscal
capacity.
In addition to its usefulness for analyzing school
aid formulas, the kind of model developed in this paper
could be applied to other types of grant or subsidy.
Revenue sharing, housing allowances, health insurance, and
foreign aid are all examples of programs with certain objec-
tives such as equalization or stimulation of some activity.
If these objectives could be stated with some precision,
then a simulation model could be used to find the best
subsidy formula. This general problem will be considered
in the final chapter.
Chapter I will discuss the reasons for wanting to
reduce inequality between school districts in expenditure
per pupil. Chaptej II describes the state aid formulas
now in use, and mentions some alternatives. Chapter III
reviews some of the previous literature on explaining
expenditures by local school districts. Chapter IV presents
the econometric model for explaining expenditure per pupil
in Massachusetts. Then Chapter V shows how the model can
be used to simulate the effects of alternative aid formulas,
and concludes that wealthy districts on average will continue
to enjoy higher expenditures per pupil under any formula
which does not compensate for class-related differences
in tastes.
Notes
(1) Serrano v. Priest, 96 California Reporter 601 (Supreme
Court oFT~Clfornia, In Bank, August 30, 1971), and
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, Federal Supplement
(U.S. District Court of Minnesota, October 12, 1971).
(2)- This has been the position advocated by the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
See Wfho Should Pay For Public Schools? A.C.I.R.
pampTlet, October TI1.
CHAPTER I
WHY REDUCE INEQUALITY IN DOLLARS PER PUPIL?
At the moment when this is being written, the court
decisions cited in the Introduction have made it seem pro-
bable that the distribution of resources for public schools
within states will somehow be equalized. Years from now
this moment may be seen as the beginning of a major reform
in school finance, or--if the U.S. Supreme Court squelches
the reform--this period may be a forgotten historical
aberration. Even though the final outcome is still uncer-
tain, it is still well worth proceeding on the assumption
that equalization of some kind will indeed occur.
Education and Income
Reducing inequality in the distribution of school
resources would at least hold out the hope for some in-
crease in equality of economic opportunity. However, no
one should be misled: even perfect equalization of school
resources would certainly not produce equality of income,
and evidence has been accumulating that education alone
cannot even equalize economic opportunity. In particular,
racial differences are one source of income inequality that
schooling alone cannot remove. Hanoch's regression analysis
of Census data showed that black males earn less than
whites of the same age and number of years of schooling. (1)
Similarly, Johnson found that blacks receive a lower average
rate of return to their private investment in schooling,
where this investment consists mainly of the earnings
foregone while in school. (2) Again, Welch's cross-section
analysis of data from states indicates that rural blacks
earn about 35% less income than rural whites who receive
the same quality and quantity of school inputs. (3) Finally,
and most telling, Weiss found the extra income resulting
from one year's worth of actual academic achievement appears
to be less for black men than for whites of the same age. (4)
All of these studies are based on cross-sectional data,
and therefore cannot truly predict the path of future
earnings or the rate of return to schooling for people
with various levels of education, because, as Eckaus has
observed, the experience of today's newborns over the next
thirty years will not exactly recapitulate the history of
today's age-thirty cohort. (5) Nevertheless, there is
little to suggest that the discrimination which presumably
caused the observed differences between black and white
returns to education will vanish in the future.
Not only does equal educational attainment fail to
guarantee equal economic opportunity, but also equal
educational resources would fail to produce equal academic
attainment. The main finding of the Coleman report was
that the socioeconomic status of the student and his
schoolmates is itself an important determinant of scholastic
achievement. (6) Although the Coleman report has provoked
much controversy, the issue now is the exact importance
of "school inputs" apart from socioeconomic background. (7)
Few would deny that background variables strongly affect
what children learn in school.
The effect of social class on academic achievement,
combined with discrimination in the labor market, explain
Ribich's finding that, if the objective is to equalize
income, it would be accomplished more efficiently by
redistributing income directly than by equalizing expendi-
tures on education. Ribich reached this conclusion through
benefit-cost analysis of various educational anti-poverty
programs. (8) He measured the benefit from a given program
as the present value of the anticipated stream of extra
earnings attributable to the program, discounted at 5%.
Benefits to the next generation were ignored because when
discounted at 5% the present value is negligible. This
procedure gave benefit/cost ratios in excess of 1.0 for
certain job retraining programs, but less than 1.0 for the
Higher Horizons compensatory education program, for a
dropout prevention program in St. Louis, and for a hypothe-
tical program of equalizing per pupil expenditures in pub-
lic schools (based on data from Project Talent). Since
by definition direct redistribution of income would have a
benefit/cost ratio of exactly 1.0, most of the educational
programs would be less efficient in equalizing income than
direct redistribution of income itself would be. Therefore
any equalization of educational resources resulting
from the recent court decisions will not be a substitute
for adequate programs of income maintenance.
There is also a danger that the good will forestall
the best--in the present instance, that redistribution of
school resources will be thought to eliminate the need
for direct redistribution of income itself. To the extent
that redistributing educational resources does reduce
socioeconomic inequalities, or at least hampers the inheri.-
tance of socioeconomic position, it may ease the pressure
for direct redi-stribution of income.
On the other hand, if everyone received education of
more equal quality, and if children of black or poor parents
still earned less when they graduated, then the unfairness
of this outcome would be even more obvious than it is now.
At presenit differences in educational attainment serve
to legitimate differences in social class, because it is
ostensibly fair for better jobs to go to people with
better academic trgining and credentials, even though lower-
class children actually have less opportunity to get
these credentials, and even when they have the credenti als
they have less opportunity to get good jobs. (9) Equaliz-
ing educational opportunity mi ght therefore increase rather
than decrease the demand for further improvement, in the
form of tougher laws against job discrimination, or out-
right redistribution of income.
Other Benefits from Education
Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to improve the
education of poor children even if schooling had no impact
at all on income. Economists have become preoccupied with
viewing education as investment in human capita: schooling
as a producer's good. But education is also a consumer's
good, providing benefits that are ends in themselves.
Some of these benefits accrue to society at large: literate
citizens are more competent. Other benefits are purely
private: the satisfaction of having and acquiring knowledge.
Therefore redistributing resources for education is justi-
fied as a way of preventing wide disparities in intellec-
tual development, quite apart from any effect on the dis-
tribution of income.
On the other hand, critics may argue that existing
schools destroy rather than develop children's minds, so
that giving the schools more money would at best be a
waste, and at worst do more harm than good. But if the
schools are really that bad, the implication is only that
resources should not be redistributed to the present school
authorities, or that redistribution should be conditioned
upon major reforms. Perhaps public schools should be
abolished and replaced through instituting a system of tuition
vouchers. This issue of quality and accountability will be
mentioned again in Chapter VI. The point here is that to
eschew any kind of redistribution would be a mistake.
Measuring Educational Inequality
Given that it is worthwhile to think about redistribu-
ting educational resources, how should inequality in
education be measured? To the possible chagrin of some, the
measure to be used in this paper is the amount of money
spent per pupil for non-capital expenditures. The weakness
of this measure is that it does not correlate perfectly
with either real input or real output from the schools.
It is not a perfect index of real input because there are
cost differences between schools and districts, and also
because a given amount of money, with given prices, could
buy an infinite number of different combinations of real
inputs.
Statistical findings on the relationship of money to
academic output, which have been well summarized elsewhere
(10), are inconclusive. The Colemar report found no
relationship between the level of ex-penditure per pupil
and scholastic achievement, but this finding has been
criticizod on the grounds that the Coleman data did not
measure the important differences in spending between
individual schools. (11) More posi tive evidence of a
connection between dollars and achievement was found in
New York State by Kiesling, though the relationship
seemed to be significant only for middle-class children
in large school districts. (12) A study by Hlanushek
using the Coleman data demonstrated an effect of certain
real inputs on achievement, but failed to find a strong
expenditure effect. (13)
There -are several reasons why the findings on ex-
penditure and achievement are inconclusive. First, as
already mentioned, differences in costs mean that the same
expenditure in different places buys different amounts of
real inputs, and therefore presumably different amounts of
output.
A second reason is the difficulty of disentangling
expenditures from socioeconomic status. If expenditure
per pupil is included as an independent variable in a
regression explaining students' achievement, but the
students' socioeconomic status is left out of the equation,
then expenditure will explain much of the variance in
achievement. But much of this explanatory power is due to
.the fact that expenditure acts as a proxy for socioeconomic
status, because places with high socioeconomic status tend
to spend more on schools. If expenditure per pupil were
added to a regression in which socioeconomic status already
appeared, then the incremental explanatory power would be
smaller. But this increment actually understates the
true effect of expenditure, since socioeconomic status was
already acting as a proxy for expenditure. Algebraically,
expenditure and socioeconomic status have a large
"tcommonality" (14), which is defined as
1.1 R2E - (R 2 E+S - R2 )
Here R2 is the proportion of the variance in student
E
achievement that is explained by expenditure per pupil
alone. This overstates the true explanatory power of
expenditure. (RE+S - RS) is the increment in proportion
of variance explained when expenditure is added to an
equation that already includes socioeconomic status.
This understates the true effect of expenditure. The
commonality therefore measures the explanatory power
shared by the two variables together. The point is that
the large commonality makes the independent effect of
expenditure hard to measure.
A third reason why statistical studies have been
inconclusive is that existing schools are inefficient.
Schools do not spend money in a way that maximizes achieve-
ment, either because they have other objectives or because
they have insufficient knowledge. They lack knowledge
about how to allocate resources to meet the particular
needs of individual children. For example, increasing the
number of white teachers may help some white students but
stifle some black students. (15) Resources would make a
difference if they were allocated more efficiently to
individual children. But this potential relationship
between expenditures and output does not show up con-
sistently in studies of existing schools, because existing
schools waste money.
Even if the relationship between expenditure and
achievement were well understood and fully documented, it
is still preferable to think in terms of redistributing
cash than to try to reduce the inequality in achievement
directly, because producing high scorcs on academic achieve-
ment tests is not the only purpose of education. Direct
redistribution of those resources which are most strongly
related to achievement would force the schools to give
lower priority to the broader kinds of l earning that achieve-
ment tests do not measure. The consumption benefits of
education might be sacrificed to the investment benefits.
Also, direct redistribution of any kind of real input,
such as teachers with high verbal skills, would inhibit
schools from seeking more efficient combinations of inputs
to produce whatever the) are trying to produce. Therefore,
given the multiple purposes and uncertain technology of
education, it makes more sense to redistribute resources
in the most general form, namely money. (16)
This does not mean that schools should have a license
to waste money. To the contrary, they should be strictly
accountable to parents and children. The schools should
serve the children, and. should keep the parents fully in-
formed.
Finally, the arguments for redistributing resources
in monetary form do not imply that equal dollars per pupil
would necessarily be the most equitable distribution.
Presumably, children with equal needs should receive
equal amounts of money. But Chapter II will show that
this, ethical principle could imply a whole range of possible
redistributive schemes.
Conclusion
A number of reasons have been offered for wanting to
equalize the distribution of resources for education.
First of all, to some extent this will equalize income.
Thougl direct redistribution of income would be more efficient,
it is less feasible politically. Moreover, cqunlizing
income or economic opportunity is not the only reason for
redistributing school resources. Education can yield
consumption benefits, both private and social, as well as
investment benefits. Finally, because the aims of education
and the methods for accomplishing them differ between
individuals, resources for educat ion should be redistributed
in the form of money, not in the form of real inputs.
Notes
(1) Giora Hanoch: "An Economic Analysis of Earnings and
Schooling''; Journal of Human Resources 2(3) :310-329,
Summer 1967.
(2) Thomas Johnson: "Returns from Investment in Human
Capital"; American Economic Review 60(4) :546-560,
September 1970.
(3) Finis Welch: "Measurement of the Quality of Schooling";
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May
1966, pp. 379-392.
(4) Randall Weiss: "The Effect of Education on Earnings
of Blacks and Whites"; Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 52(2):150-159, May 1970.
(5) Richard Eckaus: "On the Estimation of the Relations
between Education and Income"; mimeographed, MIT
Dept. of Economics , December 1970.
(6) James S. Coleman and others: Equality of Educational
OLptortunfir; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
(7) For a good introduction to this literature, see the
U.S. Office of Education's booklet, Do Teachers Make
a Difference?; OE-58042, 1970. A set~oLF~Yadings
Titdby Moynihan and Mosteller is also forthcoming.
(8) Thomas I. Ribich: Education and Poverty; Brookings,
1968.
(9) See David CohIn and Marvin Lazerson: "Education and
the Industrial Order"; mimeographed, Harvard Graduate
School of Education, 1970.
(10) James W. Guthrie: A Survey of School Effectiveness
Studies"; Chapter 2 in Do Teachers Make a Difference?,
Op. cit.
(11) Samuel Bowles and Henry Levin: "The Determinants of
Scholastic Achievement- -An Appraisal of Some Recent
Eviden.ce"; Journal of Human Resources 3:3-24, 1968.
(12) Herbert John Kiesling: Measuring a Local Government
Service: A Study of the E c y School Districts
in New YorkState; iPh.D. thesis, Harvard Dept. of
Economics, 1965.
(13) Eric A Hlanushek: The Education of Negroes and Whites;
Ph.D. thesis, MIT Dept. of Economics, 1968.
(14) -Alexander M. Mood: "Do Teachers Make A Difference?";
Chapter 1 in Do Teachers Make A Difference?, op. cit.
(15) Stephan Michelson: "The Association of Teacher
Resourceness with Children's Characteristics";
Chapter 6 in Do Teachers Make A Difference?, op. cit.
(16) A similar argument is made in the Introduction to
Stephan Michelson and Norton Grubb: The Political
Economy of School Resource Inequalities; draft, Center
for EdIucational Policy Researchi, Harvard Graduate
School of Education, 1971.
CHAPTER II
EXISTING AND PROPOSED STATE AID FORMULAS
This chapter describes the formulas now being used in
the various states to equalize educational resources among
local school districts. Only formulas for dispensing
general-purpose aid will be described, because these
grants are much larger than those for special purposes
like transportation. Since Benson (1) and Coons, Clune.,
and Sugarman (2) have already written good histories of
how these programs evolved, the discussion here will be
purely formalistic.
Types of General-Purpose Grants
The simplest formula is the flat grant. The way a
flat grant works is pictured in Figure 2.1 as Plan 1.
On this graph and on all the others in Figure 2.1 the verti--
cal axis, labelled g, measures the total amount of money
available per pupil in a local school district. The
horizontal axis, labelled t, measures the total tax rate.
This has two components, the state tax rate tc and the
local rate ti. (3) The state tax is assumed to be propor-
tional to the local tax base, so that the state tax rate tc
is the same for all districts. Plan 1 thus imposes the same
state tax rate on all districts, and in return guarantees
a certain amount of money per pupil, labelled a. Beyond
that, each district is on its own. If it levies a certain
local tax rate, it obtains whatever the local tax base yields.
FIURE 2.1 : ALTERUA TIVE AID PLANS
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The gr.aph of Plan 1 thus shows two rays emanating
from the flat grant point. Each ray represents the
opportunity frontier facing a district with a certain local
tax base. The steeper ray belongs to a richer district,
indicating that this district can get more resources per
pupil from a given rate of local tax effort.
Flat grants in practice are not always awarded in
simple proportion to the number of pupils. Sometimes the
number of students in a district is weighted by sparsity
(to reflect transportation costs), grade level, income,
or other characteristics. Or the grant may be proportional
to the number of "classroom units," which usually means
the number of teachers. Each different basis for flat
grants of course implies a different distribution of money
among districts. But for simplicity the discussion will
pretend that flat grants, as well as the other general-
purpose grants to b.he described, are on a straight per-pupil
basis.
To see why Plan 1 is not much of an equalizer, con-
sider the two sets of hypothetical indifference curves on
the graph. These represent the hypothetical preference
functions of two local school boards. In the less wealthy
school district, the indifference curves are steeper at
any point on the graph,- indicating less willingness to raise
the tax rate for the sake of a given increment in per pupil
expenditure. This difference in tastes is an empirical
hypothesis , which will be tested later in estimating the
model. For now, consider it a working hypothesis that poorer
communities are less eager, at any given level of taxes and
spending, to obtain higher expenditures by raising the tax
rate. Sufficient reasons would be: (a) A given property
tax rate represents a greater sacrifice in a poor community
because, though it takes away fewer dollars, these dol-
lars are a larger fraction of total wealth (for homeowners)
or total income (for renters) than in richer communities;
(b) Poorer communities get relatively less benefit
from the public schools than do upper-middle-class people.
The graph of Plan 1 shows that the combination of
steeper indifference curves and a lower frontier results
in lower expenditure per pupil by the poorer district.
The graph also indicates that either the difference in
opportunities or the difference in tastes would be suf-
ficient to produce this result.
However, if the level of the flat grant were very high,
and the corresponding state tax rate were also high, as in
Plan 1A, then the outcome would be considerably more equal.
The poorer district has no choice but to pay the high state
tax and receive the high level of expenditure. Plan 1A is
exactly what the Massachusetts Master Tax Plan Commission
recently proposed. (4) They suggested giving each district
a flat grant equal to 90% of the previous year's average
per pupil expenditure in the state and financing this with.
a statewide property tax. At the extreme, Plan 1A becomes
complete state financing of public schools, as in Hawaii.
Plan 2 adds a wrinkle to Plan 1. In order to qualify
for the flat grant, each district is required to levy some
minimum local tax rate tr. Unlike the state tax tc, the
proceeds from tr are retained by the district for its
own use. The result is shown in the graph of Plan 2. The
opportunity frontier for each district (two are shown)
is a ray beginning on the horizontal axis at tc, but when
the local tax rate reaches tr the ray is boosted upward
by the amount of the flat grant a.
Plan 3 is the famous foundation plan, the workhorse
of state equalization plans. The basic idea of this plan
is to guarantee to each local school district a certain
minimum level of total expenditure per pupil if it taxes
itself at a certain rate. Algebraically, the plan gives
district i a state subsidy per pupil
2.1 Si = f - trVi 
- tcVi
where f is the foundation level of per pupil expenditure,
tr is again the required local tax rate--over and above the
state tax rate tc--and Vi is the per pupil tax base in
district i. Total resources per pupil in district i are
therefore
2.2 gi = t V + S= (t, - t - tc)Vi + f
where tj is the local component of the tax rate. Obviously,
CD
gi will equal the constant f for all districts whenever
the local tax rate ti = tr + tc; that is, whenever the
total tax rate t ty + 2tc-
Plan 3, whfich- is the most common version of the founda-
tion program, contains two constraints. The first is
that Si -tc Vi That is, any district in which the
required local tax rate tr raises revenue exceeding the
foundation amount f does not have to forfeit or pay back
the excess. So the worst a district can do is to pay the
state tax and receive no offsetting subsidy. This constraint
implies, from equation 2.1, that any district for which the
tax base per pupil Vi is greater than f/tr will not be
affected by the program at all. These relatively wealthy
districts get nothing from the foundation program, so their
opportunity frontiers do not change. The graph of Plan 3
shows the opportunity locus for one such district, and
also for two poorer districts for which the program does
raise the opportunity frontiers. If the foundation level
f is small, then fewer districts will receive subsidies,
the amounts of subsidies received will be small, and the
program consequently will not equalize very much. In
practice, this is what usually happens. So empirical
studies have found that Plan 3 does not eliminate inequali-
ties among districts very well. (5)
The second constraint in Plan 3 is that Si = 0 if
ti is less than t + tc. That is, a district receives
no state subsidy at all if it taxes itself at less than
the required rate.
Plan 3 and Plan 1 are sometimes combined such that
the flat grant is subtracted from a district's foundation
aid, and the state subsidy is constra-ined to be no less
than the amount of the flat grant, a, minus the .state tax.
The effect is tormake the program less equalizing than
Plan 3 because foundation subsidies will be smnaller and
fewer districts will receive foundation aid at all. Now
any district where VI exceeds (F - a)/tr will have the same
opportunity locus as it. would have had with the flat grant
alone. Coons, Clune, and Sugariman make much of this. (6)
Plan 4 is what would happen if the first constraint
were removed from Plan 3. A district in which the revenue
raised by the required local tax rate exceeds the foundation
level now must pay the excess to the state. All distri cts
are therefore affegted by the program, ricli districts
receiving a negative subsidy. Their larger tax base now
gives them an advantage at every tax rate except at the
single point where the local tax rate ti = ty + tc
or total tax rate t = tr + 2tc.
Plan 5 is the pure version of the foundation plan,
with no constraints. All opportunity frontiers cross at
the foundation point. Rich districts still have an ad-
vantage at high tax rates, but nowi poorer districts
actually do better at low tax rates. If the foundation
level were high enough, this advantage would matter.
But in practice the foundation tax rate tr + 2tc is always
so small that districts wishing to obtain a decent level
of expenditure must tax themselves at higher rates, where
wealthier districts have the advantage.
Plan 6 belongs to a family of more sophisticated
grants, called percentage equalizing.
family is the pair of equations
The nucleus of this
Si = (1 - mVi/V)gi - tcVi ; and2.3
2.4 gi = tiVi + Si.
Solving gives total revenue per pupil
2.5 gi (ti - tc)V/m
where V is the statewide mean tax base per pupil and m is
some constant between zero and one. The noble purpose of
percentage equalizing is thus to make the amount of re-
sources per pupil available in any district strictly
proportionl to the local tax rate tij, reogardless of the
local tax base Vi Pure percentage equalizing is pictured
as Plan 8: the same linear frontier for all districts.
Plan 6, however, is not pure percentage equalizing.
It suffers from two weaknesses. The first is that the
state subsidy is proportional to local, not total, ex-
penditure per pupil:
2.6 Si =Cl - mVi/9)tiVi - tcVi
The second weakness is the constraint that the net subsidy
Si will be no less than the state tax -tc i. The result
is that now total resources per pupil are given by
CA
V~Q
2.7 gi= (2ti - tc - mtiVi/?)Vi where Vi V U/m
(ti - tc)Vi where Vi > V/m
This rather messy outcome is shown on the graph of Plan 6,
for three districts, with different amounts of local tax
base. Plan 6 is approximately what prevails in Massa-
chusetts, except that Massachusetts adds even more contort-
ed kinks and constraints, to be unravelled in Chapter IV.
A slightly more legitimate scion of the percentage
equalizing family is Plan 7, which makes the state subsidy
proportional to total not local expenditure, but still
constrains the net subsidy to be no more negative than
the state tax. The result, drawn in the graph, is that
(ti - tc)?/m where Vi < V/m
2.8 gi
(ti - tc)Vi where Vi > V/m
Although Plans 6 and 7 may seem but base imitations
of Plan 8, they are actually purer than most of the so-
called percentage equalizing plans found in practice.
The challenge of reconciling equalization with other
objectives seems to stimulate the ingenuity of state
legislatures, so that no two state plans are alike. Some
states limit the amount of gi that may be used in computing
Si, others limit the matching ratio (1 - mVi/V), some
limit Si itself, and others use arcane methods to compute
m. Some of these complexities are described in Chapter 5
of Coons, Clune, and Sugarman.
Table 2.1 shows the extent to which Plans 1 through 8
are used by each state. Table 2.1 is based on descrip-
tions of the various state programs in Public School
Finance Progranis, 1968-69, published by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. (7) The first column of
the table tells what percentage of all state and local
expenditures for public schools were accounted for by
state grants. It~.is interesting that this percentage
is significantly higher in the southern states. The next
six columns correspond to six of the plans described above.
Plans 4 and 8 are not used by any state. Also, in Table 2.1
no distinction is made between Plans 1 and IA or between
3 and 3A. The numbers in these six columns are the percent-
ages of state aid in each state that are spent on the various
plans. Adding these percentages across gives the total
percentage of state aid in each state distributed as
general -purpose grants. This is less than 100% in most
cases because states also dispense small amounts of aid
for special purposes like transportation or classes for
handicapped children. Finally, the last three columns
in Table 2.1 indicate what measures of fiscal capacity are
used for allocating aid in the various states. Assessed
value of property is the most common because the property
tax is the mfiain source of local tax revenue.
To summarize Table 2.1: most states rely on a comb-
ination of flat grants and foundation aid, which is not very
effective in equal izing the fiscal opportunities facing local
school districts. A few states use percentage equalizing,
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TABLE 2.1
CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL PURPOSE
SCHOOL AID PROGRAMS
STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
STATE AID
AS % OF
STATE + LOCAL
EXPENDITURE
75
88
% OF TOTAL STATE AID
DISTRIBUTED THROUGH PLAN #
% Equal-
Flat Grant Foundation izing
1 2 3 5 6 7
6
32(2)
44
53
89
54
43
87
MEASURE OF
WEALTH USED
Assessed
Value AGI Other 1
x
x
x
x
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho 44
37
29
34(4)
82
35
54
45
34
74
82
x
x
67
x
100
74
89
100(2)
x
x
100 x
36
TABLE 2.1 (Continued)
STATE AID
AS % OF
STATE + LOCAL F
EXPENDITURE
% OF TOTAL STATE AID
DISTRIBUTED THROUGH PLAN #
% Equal-
lat Grant Foundation izing
1 2 3 5 6 7
MEASURE OF
WEALTH USED
Assessed
VALUE AGI OTHER(')
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
27
39
14 (5)
35
58
68
23
18
62
68
65
86
99
82
8130
40
40
50
40
63
31
26
18
56
67
94(6)
7 40 37(/
3
66
27
52
82
11
67
39
STATE
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
9 .4
x
x
x
v I
37
TABLE 2.1(Continued)
STATE
Nevada
N. H.
N. J.
N. M.
N. Y.
N. C.
N. D.
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
R. I.
S. C.
STATE AID
AS % OF
STATE + LOCAL Fl
EXPENDITURE 1
42
11
44
9
29
86
50
76
33
33
28
30
44
% OF TOTAL STATE AID
DISTRIBUTED THROUGH PLAN #
% Equal-
at Grant Foundation izing
2 3 5 6 7
100 (8)
46
30
72 17
92
11
93(9)
87
95
4 32 60
58
6
38(11)
66
14
71(10)
83
MEASURE OF
WEALTH USED
ASSESSED
VALUE AGI OTHERM
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
76
x
S. D. 12
-
17 76 x
38
TABLE 2 .1 (Continued)
0 O
STATE AID DISTRIBU
AS % OF
STATE + LOCAL Flat Grant
EXPENDITURE 1 2
TOTAL STATE AID
TED THROUGH PLAN #
% Equal-
Foundation izing
3 5 6 7
MEASURE OF
WEALTH USED
ASSESSED
VALUE AGI OTHERM
Tennessee.
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
W. Va.
Wis cons in
Wyoming
59
52
59
39
38
75
60
28(12)
41
41
21
50 47
4
17
STATE
82
90
57
82
65
83
x
6
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x83
77
tJa
TABLE 2.1(Continued)
FOOTNOTES TO TABLE 2.1
(1) Other measures of district wealth include sales tax
collections, employment, automobile registrations,
vlue of farm production, median family income, and
assessed value of public utilities.
(2) Expenditure for state-run schools.
(3) About 8% of Arizona's state aid goes for so-called
"equalization," which is distributed in direct propor-
tion to assessed valuation in the district.
(4) About 5% of Connecticut's state aid groes for dis-
advantaged children. This aid is distributed in propor-
tion to the percentage of children on AFDC and the
percentage of families with incomes under $4000.
(5) About 22% of Iowa's state aid consists merely of
returning 50% of the state income tax collected in
each district.
(6) Michigan sets a higher foundation l evel, but also a
higher qualifying tax rate, for districts with less
assessed valuation per pupil.
(7) These are approximations; Minnesota actually spends
77% on a p-rogram that is like a combinat ion of
Plans 2 and 3.
(8) Nevada state law sets a different foundation level
for each of the state's 17 districts.
(9) New York also provides bonuses for very small and
very large districts.
(10) Pennsylvania guarantees to pay at least 37.5% of each
district's expenses, up to $400 per pupil (more in
high density districts and districts with pupils
from families with less than $2000 income).
(11) R. I. also spends about 5% of its state aid matching
federal Title I grants.
(12) Wisconsin also guarantees that if a district's tax
rate exceeds some maximum, despite equalizing state
aid., then the state will reimburse all of the excess
receipts over the prescribed maximum.
but usually a watered-down form.
Federal aid, such as grants for vocational education,
is often distributed simply by proportional matching,
whereby each dollar of federal aid must be matched by
a dollar from the district's own resources. In allocating
money among the states, the federal formula does entitle
poorer states to more money per pupil,but the straight
matching formula for disbursing the money to local dis-
tricts does not have any equalizing effect itself. (8)
The most equalizing federal program is the contro-
versial plan enacted as Title I of the 1965 Elementary
and Secondary Education Act. This plan represents an
entirely separate class of formulas, which take into account
demographic variables other than those measuring fiscal
capacity or effort. Title I provi des block grants to local
districts according to the number of children in low-
income families and families receiving AFDC, plus children
in institutions. (9) The amount of money per deprived
child does depend on the statewide average expenditure
per pupil, but this is related only weakly to the local
district's own effort. In effect, Title I may be con-
sidered a version of Plan 1 in which the amount of the
flat grant per pupil varies among districts, according to
demographic composition.
Equity Criteria for Evaluating Grant
Formulas, and Some Proposals
In what sense are these plans supposed to equalize
anything.? One conceivable goal of an equalization plan would
be to establish the same opportunity frontier for all
districts. By this criterion, state or federal subsidies
would be distributed to local districts so as to compensate
exactly for differences in local fiscal capacity, thus
nabling any two districts which exert the same rate of
tax effort to afford the same amount ofexpendture per
pupi . This principle was enunciated by Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman. (1-0) They call it the principle of "power
equali zing," because it equal izes the power to purchase
education. Legal briefs by Coons and others have con-
vinced the courts in California and Minnesota to adopt
this principle as an interpretation of the Fourt-eenth
Amon dmen t
Coons , Cl une, and Sugarman argue at some length that
no existing state or federal subsidy program now achieves
power equal izing. The graphs in Figure 2.1 confirm this
at a glance. Of the first nine plans, only Plan 8, pure
percentage equalizing, establishes the same opportunity
frontier for all districts. Plan 8, however, is never
used in practice. It is therefore no surprise that enor-
mous inequal ities between local districts persist under
all the state plans in actual practice, even those based
on percentage equalizing . (11)
Although none of the plans that are used in practice
succeeds in setting the same frontier for all districts,
Plan 5, the pure foundation plan, does provide that all
the opportunity frontiers share one common point, at the
foundation level. Plan 5 might therefore be called a
"point equalizing" program. Aside from the trivial fact
that several other plans establish a common point where
the local tax rate ti is zero, Plan 5 is the only point
equalizing plan that is used in practice. And Plan 5
appears only in the single state of Utah.
The graphical terminology may be extended. Plan 8 is
a form of "line equalizing," and Plan 9 would be "curve
equalizing." This plan has been suggested by Coons,
Clune, and Sugarman as the general form of power eiualizing.
To institute Plan 9 the state would first establish some
desired relationship between fiscal effort and expenditure
per pupil for all districts. An example of such a re-
lationship is the curve shown as Plan 9. The amount of
state subsidy, Si, would then be the residual amount
(positive or negative) needed to put a district on the
established curve. Si would vary with the district's
fiscal capacity and effort. Plan 9 is therefore unlike
the preceding plans, where the amount of state subsidy
is determined by some formula, and the opportunit)T
frontiers follow from that. In Plan 9 the legislature
first designs the common frontier which then determines
the subsidy scheme.
A concept of equalization that is even stronger than
equal frontiers would be that all districts should
actually get the same amount of resources per pupil.
Plan 9 or Plan 8, which do provide the same opportunity
frontier for all districts, would both fail to pass this
tougher test of equalizing actual resources, because, as
Chapter IV will show, the willingness of a school. district
to pay for public schools tends to increase with district
wealth. That is, richer districts have indifference curves
that are flatter at any point, as was shown on the graph
of Plan 1 Although Plan 9 woul d g ive both the rich anl
the poor district the same opportunity frontier, the rich
district is willing and able to sustain a higher fiscal
effort in order to g)et moro resources per pupil. If
the aim of s tate ai d is to equ alI zo expeid.i trie p cr pupil,
then this plan is inadequate.
Equal i zation of actual expenditures could be
accomplished in more than one way. One method would be
to require that every distri ct make a tax rate effort
at least as great as the richest district is just
willing to make, in return for a certain level of expendi-
ture per pupil guaranteed by the state. Althouoh any
district would still be permi tted to add a local tax
above the required rate, no district would want to. This
plan would. be equivalent to state assumption of the full
burden of school costs.
There is another way to equalize actual expenditures
which would preserve more fiscal autonomy for local school
districts, and would also be more favorable to poorer
districts. The method woul.d be to establish higher op-
portunity curves for poorer districts. This is a kind
of compensatory financing, of which Title I is an example,
since it is supposed to make larger flat grants to poorer
districts. Plans 10 and 11 are more general cases.
Plan 10 is a scheme favored by Musgrave. (12) It provides
a state subsidy per pupil
2.9 Si= ti(V - Vi) - tcVi
so that total resources per pupil
2.10 gi = tiVi + Si = tiV - tc i.
Every local district therefore confronts a linear oppor-
tunity fronti er wi th the same slope, but this frontier
is higher for districts where the per pupil tax base is
lower.
Plan 11 is a more general form of the same thing.
As with Plan 9, the state would first determine the shapes
of the opportunity frontiers directly. The amounts of
state subsidy would be implied by the frontiers, rather
than being determined by the algebrai-c formula as in
Plan 10. In determining the shapes and heights of the
curves, the state might take into account variables which
reflect educational need, such as the level of education
of the adults in the district, in addition to purely
fiscal variables such as tax base per pupil. The result
would be as shown in the graph of Plan 11 in Figure 2.1:
the steeper indifference curve, which belongs to a district
with smaller fiscal capacity but presumably greater need,
is tangent to a higher and steeper opportunity -Frontier,
so that the poorer district can choose approximately the
same level of expenditure per pupil as the richer district,
but with less fiscal effort.
Two possible criteria for equalization have now
been suggested: equal frontiers or equal expenditures.
It is clear that these imply quite different subsidy
plans. To evaluate the subsidy schemes , then, one must
evaluate the objectives they express. Such an evaluation
must involve personal beliefs and political preferences.
Normative economic theory is no help, because it Says
only that if the distributiont of income is optimal, then
taxation should be based on the marginal benefit from
publicly provided goods. However, since the distribution
of income is evidently suboptimal , taxation and subsidies
must be guided by other, second-best principles.
One such principle is horizontal equity, "equal treat-
mont of equals." This is a commonsense definition of fair-
ness, and something like it is expressed in the Con-
stitution 's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." (13)
In addition to its ethical appeal , the principle of
horizontal equity has been endorsed on grounds of ef-
fici ency. In a federal system, equal treatment of equals
by different jurisdic tions wcoulcid eliminate arti:ficial
incentives for people to move from one place to another.
As Tiebout has argued,
"Given the tax structures and incomes of
various communities offering about the same
pattern of public services, a person will
choose the community where his tax bill
is least. In fact, he may well choose
a community where the pattern of services
offered is not as nearly to his liking
as in another community, but his tax
bill is sufficiently lower to make this
a more favorable location. As a result
of unequal incomes, the resulting pattern
of public goods will be less optimal,
in a sense, than in the case where in-
comes are equal." (14)
It is thus inefficient for the rich to migrate to tax
havens where they can get more for their tax rate because
their neighbors are also rich.
However, despite its appeal, the meaning of "equal
treatment of cquails" is not at all precise. First of all,
what is meant by "equal" treatment? There are at least
two possibilities. (a) More equal treatment could simply
mean less variation in the kind or amount of treatment.
(b) Alternatively, only certain kinds of inequality may
be of concern. In particular, equal treatment may mean
only that no one is extremely deprived. In statistical
terms the first definition calls for minimizing the va-
riance of the distribution being considered, while the
second definition calls for minimizi ng the degree of
skewness to the left. Clearly, foundation plans, which
aim to guarantc some minimum level of expenditurc per pupil,
are based on the second definition of "equal" treatment.
Next, what is the "treatment" that should be made
equal? (a) Dollars spent per pupil is the treatment that
has been considered in the plans described above. (b)
Real inputs per pupil, such as teachers, textbooks, and
tape recorders are a more direct measure of the kind of
treatment pupils receive. (c) Even more direct would be
a valid measure of the output from schooling. This could
include tested academic achievement, creativi ty, or what-
ever schools are expected to produce. There is no agree-
ment, however, on what this is. (d) Going one step
further, maybe the treatment that should be equalized is
the student 's opportunity to earn money as an adult.
(e) Even more generally, the truly relevant defi ition of
equal treatment may be equal preparati on to achieve per-
sonal well -being. Most peopli would probably agree that
this final definition is the proper one in the abstract,
but strcno di sagreciments would arise over the meaning of
well-being, and how to prepare for it. The last defini tion
is therefore not operati onal. Moreover, the last three
definitions may all imply spening more real resources
on poorer children, whose family environments in some
sense make them more expensive to educate . The aibi-
guities which infest the definition of equal "treatment"
thus entail important political and moral judgments.
Final.l-y, how to define the "equals" who should receive
equal treatment? (a) One possibility is siriply to con-
sider all. children equal. Then all children should receive
equal treatment, no matter what race, class, or sex they
may be, or in what neighborhood they may reside. (b) Al-
ternatively, equal children may be defined as those with
equal need, ability, or motivation. Such a definition
would imply spending different amounts of resources on
children with different social or psychological charac-
teristics. Since some psychological characteristics in
children are correlated with their parents' social class,
the result might be to justify special programs for
"gifted" children who happen to be mostly middle-class.
On the other hand, the definition might justify special
programs for "difficult" lower-class children. (c) Another
classification would group together those children whose
families exert the same fiscal effort for their schooling.
This is the rationale of power equalizing: any two districts
with the same school tax rate should be entitled to the
same quality of schools. (d) Related to this last defi-
nition is the definition that considers as equals all
those children whose parents pay the same amount of money
for schooling. This leads to the policy proposed by
Buchanan (15) of equalizing the fiscal residual for
families of equal income. The fiscal residual is the
amount of government services valued at cost, minus the
amount of taxes paid. Since a given tax rate will yield
a larger amount of money from a wealthier family, this fourth
definition of "equal" pupils is more favorable to the rich
than the preceding definition, which measured fiscal
effort by the rate, not the amount, of tax.
These sets of definitions could generate no fewer than
forty distinct meanings of the phrase "equal treatment
of equals." The principle underlying Plan 3, that every
school district should be enabled to support some minimum
foundation level of expenditure per pupil at some given
level of fiscal effort, is a combination of definition
(b) of "eoqual" treatment, definition (a) of "treatment,"
and definition (c) of "equals." Alternatively, definitions
(a), (a), and (c) produce the principle that every dis-
trict should face the same opportunity frontier, which
underlies Plans 8 and 9. The compensatory principle of
establishing higher opportunity curves for poorer districts,
which is the rationale for Plans 10 and 11, can be jus-
tified by defining horizontal equity as (a), (a), and
(a). And so on. Since "equal treatment of equals"
could thus justify every one of the plans described above,
the general principle of horizontal equity does not dis-
tinguish one best plan.
Private Schools, Taxes, and Vouchers
Several of the plans above would provide for negative
subsidies to wealthy districts. The state would actually
take away some of the revenues raised by local taxes.
This would certainly reduce the incentive to levy local
taxes in wealthy districts. Such a district might then
choose to close down its public schools, and send its
children to private schools where the state would not
take a cut out of expenditures. This would be very de-
trimental to any families in the district unable to afford
private schools. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman suggest pre-
venting this by the state requiring every local district
to support its public schools at some minimum level, or
by making state aid so generous that even wealthy districts
get some subsidy, though much less than poor districts.(16)
Another way to prevent wealthy districts from abandon-
ing public schools entirely would be to use state taxes to
redistribute money between districts, instead of raking
off a portion of revenues raised by local taxes. Then
the district's payment to the state would not depend on
its own school tax effort. At the same time, the subsidy
formula could give rich as well as poor districts a
large enough increment in total resources per pupil for
every increase in the local school tax rate, to provide
P ctrong incentive to support local public schools. This
implies a version of Plan 11 in which the intercept, which
represents the state tax rate, is farther to the left
for wealthier districts than for poor ones, but the op-
portunity locus itself is steeper, or at least no flatter
than it would have been in the absence of state interven-
tion.
A more radical solution to the problem of private
schools would be tuition vouchers. These are tax-supported
grants to families , which may be spent on any approved
school, whether public or private. The merits and mechanics
of various voucher systems have been carefully thought
out by Jencks and his associates. (17) Coons (18) notes
that tuition grants to families are formally analogous
to state aid for local districts. The graphical analysis
in Figure 2.1, and the definitions of horizontal equity,
can be applied to- families in the same way as they were
applied to school districts. Of course vouchers would
entail major changes in the structure of state and local
government. But they might also allow more consumer
sovereignty, more variety in schools, and more effective
equalization.
Summary
Among the many possible definitions of horizontal equity,
the two most relevant to existing state school aid formulas
are equalization of the opportunity frontier facing local
school di stricts, and equalization of actual expenditure
per pupil. Equali zing the opportunity frontier would
mean that any two districts with the same school tax
rate would get to spend the same number of dollars per
pupil. This is different from the situation that now
prevails, where a wealthier district gets more money than
a poor district with the same tax rate. Examination of
existing state aid formulas reveals that no formula in
actual use does go so far as to equalize the opportunity
frontier for all districts. Therefore no existing formula
could ever achieve the more ambitious aim of equalizing
actual expenditure per pupil in every district. However,
some of the existing plans do begin to approach frontier-
equalizing. Equalizing the opportunity frontiers for all
districts apparently represents an outer limit to the
willingness of state legislatures to equalize resources
for education. It also seems to be what the courts
will require. (19)
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CHAPTER III
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE FISCAL BEHAVIOR
OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS
This chapter sets the context for the econometric
model to be presented in the next chapter. The purpose of
the model is to permit simulation of how local school
districts in Massachusetts would alter their own expendi-
ture per pupil in response to hypothetical changes in the
formula for distributing general-purpose state school aid.
The present chapter describes some of the previous research
on the fiscal behavior of local school districts, especially
on the response to state aid. The intention is to identify
the various methods that have been applied to this problem,
and to summarize the major findings as well as the weak-
nesses of each approach. This chapter is by no means an
exhaustive survey of the abundant research on the fiscal
behavior of school districts. Fortunately, good surveys
have recently been published.(1)
The School District as a Collectivity
Onc way to analyze how money gets spent on public schools
is to view the school district as a collectivity. A
classical example of this approach is Lindahl's famous
theorem that a Pareto-optimal allocation of public costs
and benefits would equate each citizen's marginal willing-
ness to pay for the public good equals the marginal cost
of production. (2) James Buchanan has written a great
deal about how group decisions may diverge from Pareto
optimality. (3)
Buchanan's techniques have been applied specifically to
local school districts by Robin. Barlow. (4) Figure 3.1
reproduces Barlow's graphical analysis of a school district's
expenditure decision. It shows the demand curves of
individuals A, B, and C for additional output, which is
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assumed to be a pure public good. DD' is the vertical sum
of the individual demands. The efficient level of output
is OE, where DD' equals the constant marginal cost of pro-
duction. The amount demanded by each individual, however,
is determined by the tax structure. If OF, OG, and OH
are the per unit tax charges to A, B, and C respectively,
then E will demand ON units of output, B will want OK, and
C will dema.nd only OJ.
Now introduce the assumption of maj ority voting:
the level of output actually chosen will be the highest
level at which marginal benefit is no lower than marginal
tax cost for two of the three voters. With the tax
structure shown, the output chosen will be OK. :,he way
to reach the efficient output OE would be to set the
marginal tax share for E, who is the swing voter, equal
to his marginal benefit at OE, That is, under majority
rule the level of public output will be at the efficient
level if and only if the median voter's rarginal tax
equals his marginal benefit at that efficient level.
Using data for Michigan, Barlow concluded that school
cistri-cts are actually spending less than they should,
because for median- income households the estimated marginal
tax under the existing tax structure exceeds what the
estimated marginal ,benefit from schools would be at the
efficient level of output.
A set of papers presented at the 1971 meetings of the
American Economics Association carries this 'approach in
other directions. (5) BI-radford and Gates, like Barlow,
describe a school district as a group of individually
rational consumers. But unlike Barlow they derive the
predictive rather than the normative implications. With
majority voting, they show that a matching grant from a
higher level of government wi 11 ind"uc more expenditure
on the public good than would a block grant of the same siz e.
A clear corollary of the Barlow-Bradford-Oates analysis
GO'.
is that not all voters iill be in equilibrium under majority
rule. Some will have positive and others negative excess
demand for the public good. In another of the papers
presented to the AFA 1971 meetings, Heins discusses the
longer-run implications of these excess demands. If fed-
eral taxes are more progressive than local taxes, then
federally supported grants may produce stronger demands
for the subsidized service among the poor than among the
well-off members of the local community. The results
might include out-migration of the rich, politi-cal ex-
pression of discontent by the poor, or alterations in
the local tax structure to make the poor pay a larger share.
This line of analysis has some intriguing extensions.
Instead of considering educational output in the aggregate,
it would be possible to deal with decisions on separate
neighborhocd schools. Graphi cally', this would imply that
individuals have different demand curves for each others
schools, although their tax shares are the same for spending
on every school because the schools are in the sa1me taxing
district. Suboptimality is virtually guaranteed in this
system, because even if the tax structure happened to pro-
duce the efficient level of spending on one school, it
would be unlikhely to have this result for the other schools,
assuming some symmetry in the demand curves.
It would be interesting to see if this framework
could reveal the political rationality of lower expenditurc
per pupi 1 in poor neighborhoods (6) and the regressive
p3roperty tax. To some extent it would be in the interest
of the poor in central cities to offer the rich some
concessions, as Buchanan has argued, so that the rich will
not take their greater taxpaying ability to the suburbs.
The key question is whether the amount of these concessions
to the rich in reality already exceeds the fiscal benefit
to the poor.
The theoretical power of treating the school district
as a collectivity is also its empirical weakness: every-
thing depends on knowing the demand curves. In practice,
these are extremely difficult to measure, especially for
small groups. Barlowe's household demand curves were
actually estimated from cross-section data on school
districts. This data may not give a bad approximation to
thc demand curves of different income classes, but it
would be of no use in tryin g to measurc the demands of
black fami lies, cldless households, or families wi th
children in privatea schools.
On the other hand, the analytical framework might
suggest qualitative hypotheses that can be testd with
aggregate data on school districts. For example, the
model presented in Chapter IV includes the hypothesis
that districts with a large r proportion of hom1eowners
will tend to spend less on schools (other things like income
assumed equal) because homeowners, who face the loss of
equity in th-eir property, are more threatened than tenants
by the local property tax. In terms of Figure 3.1, this
hypotbesis means that a homeowner will perceive his mar-
ginal tax cost to be higher even if his actual tax payment
in dollars is the same as a tenant's.
Ultimately, any statement about the relationship
between population characteristics and the aggregate level
of spending in a school district must make some assumption
about political interaction among individuals with different
demand and marginal tax curves. But analyzing the school
district as a collectivity is probably more useful in
explainiing variation withi n school districts than between
them.
The School District as a Bureaucracy
A related- approach views the determination of school
budgets as a problem in organi zati anal decision-making .
A good example is Donald Gerwin's study of the budgeting
process in the Pittsburgh school system. (7) Gerwin
boiled down his obser-vations to a set of rules, which he
then used to simulate the course of expenditures over a
period of years. Exampi es of these rules are:
Approve all departmental requests which do not exceed last
year's amount;
Grant a general salary increase when no comparable school
districts have lower B.A. starting salaries for teachers;
Float new bonds if the amount of cash in the workin; capital
acceunt falls below a critical level.
This kind of analysis aims to explain variation in one
district over time, but it can yield hypotheses for ex-
plaining differences in the level of expendi ture between
school districts at one point in tiIme. For example, the
cross - se ction e conome tric s tudy by James , Kelly , and
Garms used dummy variables to reflect whether the board
of education was elected or appointed, whether the busi-
ness manager reported to the board of education or the
superintendent, whether boards were selected at large or
by ward, whether the assessor was elected or appointed,
and whether any other governmental agency had authority
to reduce the budget passed by the board. of education. (8)
The only effect of these variables that turned out to be
signi ficant was that, in a subsample of 48 large southern
districts, school boards selected by wards tended to spend
more per pupil. TIs probably indicatos some log-rolling.
In the model presented in Chapter IV, one of the
determinants of local expenditure per pupil i s the total
popul ation of the di strict. Some of the influence of this
variable has to do with the budgeting process, because
school committees in larger districts are confronted by
better organized and more powerful unions of teachers and
other employees, who are constantly pressing for higher
salaries. School boards in smaller districts, in contrast,
would be relatively more susceptible to pressure from
local taxpayers, who resist higher spending in general.
So the process of bureaucratic budgeting apparently can
explain some of the variation in spending among school.
districts.
The School District as a Single Consumer: Theory
An approach more orthodox than the political one has
been to apply the economic theory of the consumer to the
behavior of local governments such as school districts.
A clear exposition of this approach is in Williams' text-
book on public finance. (9) In a diagram like Figure 3.2,
Williams depicts the choices made by a local government
concerning the level of expenditure on two different services.
The local government is assumed to receive a grant which
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varies "in proportion to the number of units of the grant-
aided service that is provided by the receiving government."
The two steeper solid lines in Figure 3.2 show the possibi-
lities for providing various combinations of services if
the grant were not available; the higher curve corresponds
to a higher level of total public spending. The flatter
two lines show the possibilities with the proportional
matching grant. At the level of total expenditure corre-
sponding to the line AB, the effect of the matching grant,
given the preferences expressed by the indifference curves
in the picture, would be to shift the composition of services
from point p to point q.
Figure 3.2, however, does not reveal how the local
government decides on a certain level of total spending.
This decision is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The opportunity
frontier in Figure 3.3 is derived from Figure 3.2. Using
the unsubsidized service as the unit of measurement,
point q corresponds to expenditure from local revenues
equal to OA for both services, but to a total budget of OD.
The matching grant is AD. In Figure 3.3 the amounts OA
and OD determine the point q'. Similarly, point s in
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Figure 3.2 corresponds to s' in Figure 3.3. The shape of
the resulting opportunity frontier thus depends on the
preferences between the two services, expressed by indif-
ference curves in Figure 3.2. But there are also indif-
ference curves in Figure 3.3, showing the local government's
willingness to raise local expenditures (i.e., local taxes)
in order to increase total public consumption. These
preferences correspond to preferences between public and
private consumption in the local community, where public
and private goods are considered as two composite commodities.
Given these preferences, some point t is det erminned to be
the best, and this in turn determines a point in Figure 3.2.
That is, each level of total expenditure would imply a best
combination of services, so choosing the best level of
total spending imp lies a best of all best combinations.
Using this framcwork, Williams demonstrates that a
matching grant induces a higher level of spending on the
subsidized service, and a higher level of total expendi-
turo as well, than would a block grant of the same size.
He also demonstrates that requiring the local government
to undertake a certain minimum level of expenditure before
it may receive any assistance at all could induce more
local spending en the subsidized service per dollar of
sub si d y than would a matching grant with no such requirement.
Emplo)ing the same kind of analysis, Wi ld has shown
that a block grant earmarked for a parti cular local service
has no more stimulating effect on that service than a
block grant with no earmarking , unless the amount of the
grant exceeds thc total amount that the local govcrnmewnt
would have spent on the subsidized service in the absence
of any grant. (10) Among Wilde's other conclusions is
the finding that a matching grant with a ceiling on the
total amount is exactly equivalent to a simple block grant
if the local government is spending at a high enough level
so that it receives the maximum amount of subsidy allowed.
Implicit in the analysis by Williams and Wilde is the
assumpti on of separability in the preference function of
the local government. This has been made explicit in a
paper by Robert inman, who treated the problem algebrai-
cally as well as gr aphically, to derive conclusions like
those of Williams and Wilde. (11) "Weak separability,"
according to Inman, means that the government's preference
function is such that the marginal rate of substitution
among various services is independent of the levels of the
various taxes, and the marginal rate of substitution among
different local taxes does not depend on the levels of
services. In other words, the government can first decide
how much of the community's income to allocate between
public and private consumption ; then it makes separate
decisions about how to raise and how to spend the indicated
amount of public revenue. TInrman does not discuss the
robustness of his conclusions with respect to this assump-
tion.
The question of separability in the utility function
can be avoided if a school district is assumed to have
only one tax and one public good. This approach has been
talen by Barro (12) , who assumes that the school district
maximizes a preference function of the form
3.1 U = U(e,x)
subject to the budget constraint
3.2 pcae + p x = y,
"where c is the amount' of education provided per student
and x is the aggregate amount of other goods consumed per
capita by residents of the commPunity, pe and px are the
prices of the two goods, y is per capita personal incone
in the conmnunity, and a is the ratio of average daily
attendanco to population in the district.
conditions f maximization give
3.3
The first order
m(e,x) = pa ,
where m(e x-)= 1U/aeYtT/x is the marginal rate of substitution
of x for e, and p = pe/pX. Barro assunes that am/ae < 0
and amr/Dx > 0 ; so nei thor good can be inferior. He
therefore finds that the income derivatie is always positive:
de 1 am imnd- P / (pa ) .dy px ax Dx Do
Also, the price derivative is always negative:
do a m Pa
- = - 5 - ( 1 = e - -) / ( n a 1 .Ifpe pX x - x e
An interesting result falIs out at tliis point. Since
p and a enter symmetrically in the budget equation 3.2,
3.4
3.5
de/da may be computed simply by replacing a by p0 and
vice versa in equation 3.5. Then the elasticity of educa-
tional output with respcct to the proportion or students
to population is identical with the price elasticity.
This may provide an indirect way of measuring the price
elasticity empirically. Barro notes that this result
depends on assuming m(e,x) independent of a.
State aid in the form of a flat grant of s dollars
per pupil would change the budget constraint to
3.6 p ae + pxx = y + as.
Then de/ds = a(de/cdy) , which is positive, so that increas-
ing the flat grant will always augment total expenditure.
However, "an increase in lump-sum aid always brings about
a reduction in local educati-onal outlay." Locally-funded
expenditure per pup i I 1 s L =pee - s. Therefore dL/ds
Pe (de/ds) - 1 = pea(de/dy) - 1, so
dL = am 3m _-
3.7 a dO _;= - DVT e ax De
which is always negative.
If state aid were provided on a matching basis, so that
the local district were required to pay only some fraction
r of its total educational expenditure, then the new
budget constraint would be
3.8 rpeae + prx = y.
This is just like the original budget equation 3.2, except
that r mult ipC I s a. Therefore the now price derivative
can be found by substituting ra for a in 3.5, giving
de ra m r am Dm
eT xDPx x ae
which is still negative, but less so than without the matchin.
grant. Now since pC and r enter symmetrically in 3.8, the
derivative with respect to r can be computed simply be
interchanging r and p. in 3.9:
3.10 d = - pa(1 + e )/(rpa x - *
Increasing r, a or pC always reduces e, Raising the local
portion r will reduce the amount of locally-funded expendi-
ture per pupil, rpee, if the price elasticity of e is less
than -1.0 (the elasticities of e with respect to r, a
and p. are identical because they all appear in the same
way in 3.8). .Conversely incrensing the state matching
ratio 1-r will always raise educat ional output per pupil
e, and total expenditur'e per pupil, pee, but it may reduce
expenditure per pupil from local sources, rpe, if the price
el asticity of e is between 0 and -1.0. Matching grants are
therefore capable of stiulating locally -funded expenditure
at least in some cases, unlike block grants which always
reduce spending from local sources.
Barro also considers the effects of equalizing state aid,
the amount of which depends on the amount of local taxable
property; and he discusses the effects of the state taxes
used to finance state aid.
By fully exploiting conventionaL consunption theory,
-Barro succeeds in providing "a firmer theoretical basis for
empirical investigation of the doterminants of educational
spending and the effects of intergovernmental aid."
However, his analysis does not go far enough to fulfill
his further aim of providing "a foundation for predictive
models than can be used to evaluate proposed educational
aid formulas." As it stands, the theory yields only
qualitative , not quanti-tative predictions. To quanti tative
questions it provides onl)y the economist's universal
answer: it depends on the elasticity.
The model to be developed in the next chapter will
depart from orthodox consumer theory by omitting the
community's budget constraint as such. Instead, the local
tax rate wil il enter the s cho ol board's preference function
in a negative way. This is not equivalent to using a
budget constraint, because the impa-ct of the local nroperty
tax rate on local disposable income will vary with the
proportion of community property that is owned by non-
residents. Civen the choice , it is better to put the tax
rate in the preference function than to use a budget con-
straint on community income, for at least two reasons.
First, it is more realistic: political decision-making
focuses on the tax rate; the school board would seldom
even know how much disposable income it was leaving for
non-school consumption. Second, using a budget constraint
builds into the model an equivalence between block grants
and local income. This equivalence may not hold in
reality: at least it is not valid to assert a priori
that a dollar of block grants will affect local spending
exactly as muci as a doll ar of additional local income.
The School District as a Consumer: Empirical Findings
Many previous studies have used regression models to
explain empirica l ly what determines the level of spending
by states, local governments, and school districts. These
studies vary in the rigor of their theoretical derivations,
in statistical sophistication, and in the extent to which
they focus on behavior in response to intergovernmental
grarts. Moreover, none of the models i have seen s specified
so as to permit simulation of 1hothetical grant formulas,
because they all combine different matching and block
grants into one single quantity. Nevertheless, it is
useful to examine some oif the better studies, to learn what
empirical relationships they have discovered.
Table 3.1 sunmarizes the results of some of the relevant
studies of school spending. All of them found some posi-
tive association between expenditure and local wealth,
measured by average income, value of property, proportion
of population in high income brackets or high occupational
strata. .Wealthier, higher-class districts spend more on
schools both because the residents may have a better ap-
preciation of how education can help their children (and
in such di stricts the schools probably do improve the
childrens life chances), and also because they simply
have more ability to pay.
r
DETERMINANTS OF EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL
Dependent Variable
Single Equation Models
Exogenous
Income District State or
Size Federal
Aid
+
Brazer
1959
(13)
Miner
1963
(14)
40 large
city
school
districts
1700 dis-
tricts in
23 states
1700 dis-
tricts in
23 states
80 dis-
tricts in
Mass.
(random
sample)
James, 589 dis-
Thomas in 10
and Dyck states
1963
(15)
Bishop
1964
(16)
Davis
1964
(17)
James,
Kelly,
and
Garms
1966
(18)
341 dis-
in Mass.
134 dis-
tricts
in Pa.
107 large
city
school
distircts
+
% of
Pop.
Under
Age 11
+
total current
expenditure
per capita
total current
expenditure
per capita
current expendi-
ture per pupil
from local sources
current expendi-
ture per pupil
from local sources
total current
expenditure
per pupil
total current
expenditure
per pupil
instructional
expenditure
per pupil
total current
expenditure
per pupil
+ +
+
+
+
+
Variables
SES:
Occup.
or Educ.
Level
Home % of % of Child-
Owner- Pupils ren Not in
ship in Second- Public
ary Grades Schools
+
District Equaliza- Pop. Proper-
in SMSA; tion Grants Density ty
or Non- as % of Value
Rural State Aid
+
+ +
+
+ +
+
+
-+-
+ + +
Hickrod 72 dis-
and
Sabulao
1969
(19)
tricts in
in Boston
metropo-
litan area
total expendi-
ture per
pupil
TABLE 3.1
Author Sample
+
+
* 4.
TABLE 3.1 (Continued)
Author Sample Dependent Variable Exogenous Variables
Single Equation Models Income District State or % of SES: Home % of % of Child- District Equaliza- Pop. Proper-
Size Federal Pop. Occup. Owner- Pupils ren Not in in SMSA: tion Grants Density ty
Aid Under or Educ. ship in Second- Public or Non- as % of Value
Age 18 Level ary Grades Schools Rural State Aid
McMahon 50 states total current
1970 expenditure as
(20) fraction of per-
sonal disposable
income
+
Multi-Equation Models
Struyk 140 large
1970 districts
(21) in New
Jersey
Michel- 160 dis-
son tricts
and in
Grubb Mass.
(in
progress,
1971)
(22)
93 dis-
tricts
in S.
Carolina
total expenditure
per pupil
local school
revenue per
pupil
(Title I)
local school
revenue per
pupil
(% white)
+ +
LA
As for negative factors, several studies found that a
high proportion of homeowners tends to depress the level of
spending. The probable cause is that raising property
taxes reduces the value of a house, and may even force
people to sell at a loss. Even though tenants pay property
taxes in their rents, they do not face this danger of capital
loss, so they offer less resistance to the tax.
The proportion of children not in public schools some-
times has a positive effect on public school spending,
and sometimes a negative effect. This contradicts Barro's
conclusion, which followed from his use of a community
budget constraint. But, as James, Kelly and Garms have
explained, this variable can work both ways because, on
the one hand, fewer children in public schools means
a given amount of fiscal resources is spread over a smaller
number of pupils; on the other hand, it also means more
voters will oppose taxes to support the public schools.
Aside from this theoretical ambiguity, the proportion of
children in public schools or the complementary variable,
proportion in non-public schools, are bad variables to use
because correlation with the denominator of the dependent
variable (expenditure per pupil) may produce a spurious
negative coefficient for the percentage in public school,
or a spruious positive coefficient for the percentage not
in public school.
In addition to the foregoing exogenous variables,
some of the studies use endogenous variables such as the
local school tax rate, the pupil/teacher ratio, or the
number of auxiliary staff. These variables are not deter-
mined pri or to the level of spending- -they are determined
simultaneously. Therefore if such variablos are included
the model should be explicitly specified in more than
one equation, and appropriate econometric procedures
should be used. The studies by Struyk and by Michelson
and Grubb are examples of the correct approach.
State and federal g rants themselves are not exogenous
if they require local matching. The correct procedure
would be to treat block grants as exogenous, and to usc
the known matching formulas to substitute out matching
grants entirely . The studies by St ruyk and by Michelson
and Grubb , whijO superior to the single-cquatioi models
in their handling of other endogenous var iab es , still
fail to capture the exact re la ti onship between i ocal spend
ing and matching grants. This misspecificati on produces
some anomolous results , such as a negativc coefficient on
local spending in the equation for state matching aid.
The model presonted in the next chapter goes to great
lengths to represent more accurately the relationshiip
between local spending and state matching.
One of. the most important empirical questions is the
extent to which state aid merely replaces rather than
stimulates local expenditure. Four of the studies sumna-
rized in Table 3.1 throw light on the issue. Of the
single-equation studies, Miner's estimates imply that
a dollar of state aid would displace about $1.02 of local
spending. Bishop's estimate is 20$. However, Bishop's
equation is rather sketchily specified, omi tting important
variables such as income. Miner's estimate may be over-
stated because the independent variable in his equation
is the ratio of state aid to total school revenue, the
denominator of which corresponds to the dependent variable
itself, total school spending. This produces a strong
negative correlation over and above any true negative
association between the amount of state aid and the level
of total spending. Furthermore, both Bishop's and Miner's
estimates are biased because some state aid is not endogenous:
that part of state aid which is allocated on a matching
basis depends directly on the amount of local spending.
A single equation cannot separate the two directions of
causality.
The estimates from the two multi-equation models are
potentially more reliable. Struyk finds that a dollar of
aid reduces locally-funded spending by about 40$. Michelson
and Grubb ran several equations, and their estimates
range from reductions of more than a dollar to actual
increases up to. 30? in locally-raised revenue due to an
additional dollar of aid. None of these estimates,
however, is significantly different from zero. And, in
Massachusetts at least, the difficulty probably arises
from the failure to specify procisely the relationship
between local spending and state aid.
In addition to all these problems, none of the studies
summarized in Table 3.1 could make any quantitative pre-
dictions about the effect of changing the matching formulas,
because the parameters of the matching formula are not
embodied in the estimating equations. In order to derive
a behavioral equation that does embody these parameters, it
is necessary to start with the school district's objective
function. The exercise then becomes -to estimate the coeffi-
cients in the ojbective function itself. The effect of other
aid formulas on local spending can subsequently be simulated
by maximizing the estimated objective function subject to
the new budget constraint imposed by the new aid formula.
Estimation of the objective function of local govern-
ments has been carried out by Henderson, but he did not
use the estimates for simulating new aid formulas. (23)
Henderson's study also has some shortcomings. His "com-
munity's ordinal welfare" function is
3.11 N = (a 0 + a1Y + a2R + a 3 P)logG + X.
G and X denote public and private expendi ture per cap i ta,
respectively. P is population; Y and R are per capita
personal income and intergovernmental grants. The obvious
motive for choosing this functional form was to obtain a
linear behavioral equation when N is maximized with respect
to X and G. But this linearity is achieved at some cost
in terms of theoretical validity. The function 3.11,
for instance, implies that the level of public consumption
has no effect on the marginal utility of private consumption,
-A
or vice versa. Also, there is no theoretical justifica-
tion for including intergovernmental grants R as a direct
determinant of the marginal utility of public consumption G.
Anothcr shortcoming of Henderson's analysis is that it
considers only the total amount of intergovernme.ntal grants,
without allowing for variation in distribution formulas.
A superior specification in this respect was formulated by
Gramlich (24), who included the matching ratio for grants
in writing the state-local public utility function as
3.12 U ali(E - kG) - a (2 3(k) 2
+ a 5 (Y - T) _(Y - T) 2  a7 (C -B) -r(C - B) 22 72
Here E = total expenaditure, G = the amount of grants-in-
aid, k = the legally required matching ratio for receiving
grants, Y = total community income, T = local taxes, and
C and B denote cap ital outlays and borrowing respectively.
The term (E - kG) represents what the state-local govern-
ment is "willing to support unassisted by federal matching
grants," and kG is "a term with different uti lity parameters
which reflect the utility of grant-aided programs."
This utility function also has problems. First of all,
like Hender'son 's local welfare function 3.11, Gramlich' s
state-local preference function 3.12 suffers from the lack
of interaction terms. For instance , the marginal utility
of public expenditure is not affected by changes in the
level of local taxes, or vice versa. Secondly, Gramlich
treats federal grants as exogenous, despite his explicit
inclusion of matching requirements. He thus errs in
deriving his regression equations by maximizing U with respect
to E, T, and B. The true control variables, in addition
to the level of borrowing B, are expenditure on the subsi-
dized service and other expenditure. If borrowing always
equals capital outlay, then taxes would be determined
automatically by the levels of subsidized and unsubsidized
expenditure.
Conclusions from Review of the Literature
Research into the behavior of local governments such
as school districts has been both theoretical and empiri-
cal. On the theoretical side, analysis of a school district
as a single consumer has produced qualitative results.
For instance, a matching grant should stimulate public
spending more than a block grant of the same amount.
However, such analysis has come under increasing attack
on the grounds that the process of collective decision-
making may yield different results altogether. Heins (25)
cites an unpublished paper by Goetz and McKnew, who
"demonstrate that this (more stimulating
effect of matching grants) cannot be proved
theoretically, just as Giffin demonstrated
that one cannot prove that individual
demand curves must slope downward. Given
the state of the theory, the question of the
relative power of various grant forms to
stiumlate public expenditures remains an
empirical question.
The empirical studies, on the other hand, in general
have tried only to identify what determines the amount
of local public spending and taxation. They have not
succeeded in measuring the effects of different grant
formulas. To do this requires actual estimation of a
preference function for local school districts. Henderson
has done this for local governments in general, and
Gramlich for state and local governments combined. But
serious questions can be raised about the utility func-
tions they postulate. Furthermore, both of them stop
short of using the estimated utility function to make
quantitative predictions about the effects of alternative
grant formulas. This will be the purpose of the model
described in the next chapter.
Notes
(1) G. Alan Hickrod and Cesar M. Sabulao: Increasing
Social and Economic Inequalities among Suburban
Schools; Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1969.
(2) Leif Johansen: "Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of
Determination of Public Expenditure"; International
Economic Review; September 1963.
(3) A recent exposition is James M. Buchanan: The
Demand and Supply of Public Goods; Rand McNally, 1968.
(4) Robin Barlow: "Efficiency Aspects of Local School
Finance"; Journal of Political Economy 78(5):1028-1040,
Sept./Oct. 1970. For a more sociological treatment
of this general question, see Warren Bloomberg, Jr.
and Morris Sunshine: Suburban Power Structures and
Public Education; Syracuse University Press, 1963.
(5) American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May
1971, pp. 440-467.
(6) Patricia Cayo Sexton: Education and Income; Viking,
1974. Stephan Michelson: "The Political Economy
of Public School Inequalities"; forthcoming in
Martin Carnoy (ed.): The Political Economy of
Education; McKay, 1972.
(7) Donald Gerwin: Budgeting Public Funds: The Decision
Process in an Urban School District; Wisconsin
University Press, 1969.
(8) H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms:
Determinants of Educational Expenditure in Large
Cities of the United States; Stanford University
School of Education, 1966.
(9) Alan Williams: Public Finance and Budgetary Policy;
Praeger, 1963; pp. 171-180.
(10) James A. Wilde: "The Expenditure Effects of Grant-in-
Aid Programs"; National Tax Journal 21(3):340-348;
Sept. 1968.
(11) Robert Inman: "Analytics of Grantsmanship: Towards
a Policy Model of Local Governments"; mimeographed,
Harvard Dept. of Economics, June 1970.
(12) Stephen M. Barro: "An Economic Analysis of the
Determinants of Spending for Public Education"; The
RAND Corp., January 1970.
(13) Harvey E. Brazer: "City Expenditures in the United
States"; National Bureau for Economic Research,
Occasional Paper No. 66, 1959.
(14) Jerry Miner: Social and Economic Factors in SIending
for Public Educat Vo~;~ Syracuse Uni0els~i ty Press, 196-.
(15) H-. Thomas James, J. Alan Thomas, and Harold Dyck:
Wealth, Expenditure, and Dcci sion-Making for Education;
8tanford~Thversity School oiEducation, 1963.
(16) George A. Bishop: "Stimulative versus Substitutive
Effects of State School Aid in New England";
National Tax Journal 17:133-143, June 1964.
(17) Otto A. Davis: "Empirical Evidence of Political
Influences upon the Expenditure Policies of Public
Schools"; in Julius Marg olis (ed.) : The Public
Economy of Ur)an Communities ; Resources 7 r t1e
Future, 1965.
(3.8) 11. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms:
op. cit.
(19) G. Alan ickrod and Cesar M. Sabulao: op. cit.
(20) Walter M. McMahon: "An Economic Analysis of Major
Determinants of Expenditures on Public Education";
Review of Economics and Statistics 52:242-253, 1970.
C21) Raymond G. Struyh: "Effects of State Grants-in-Aid
on Local Provision of Education and Wel fare Servi ces
in New Jersey"; Journal of Regional Science 10:225-
235, 1970.
(22) Stephan Michelson and Norton Grubb The Political
Economy of School Res ource Inequa l tics ; ir-t-,
Center ~or Eductional Pal icy Ras earch , Harvard
Graduate School of Education; 1971.
(23) James M. Henderson: "Local Government Expenditures
A Social We lfare Analysis"; Reviewv: of Economics and
Statistics 50: 156-163, 1968.
(24) Edward M. Gramlich: "State and Local Governments and
Their Budget Constraint"; Inte rnational Economic
Review 10(2) : 163-182, June 196 9 .
(25) In AER Papers and Proceedings, May 1971, loc. cit.
CHAPTER TV
A PROTOTYPE MODEL FOR SIMULATING THE
RESPONSE OF MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO
HYPOTHETICAL CHI ANGES IN THE STATE AID FORMU LA
This chapter presents the prototype of a model to ex-
plain expenditures by local school districts in Massachu-
setts. The formula for distributing state school aid
changed radically in 1966, with the adoption of the so-
called NESDEC formula, a diluted version of percentage
equalizing. The rationale of the NESDEC formula will be
discussed in Chapter V. The present chapter will confine
itself to describing and evaluating the simulation model
itself, which was estimated for both 1965-66 and 1968-69,
to test whether the model could explain local spending under
two very different state aid formulas.
Assumptions of the Model
1. School boards have consistent preferences regarding
taxes and spending. In order to predict their response
to changing aid formulas, it is necessar)y to discover some-
thing about the preferences: that is, to estimate the pre-
ference function they are assumed to maximize. This
preference function, however, does not represent what
school committees should maximize; it is not a social
welfare function.
2. One of the two main elements in the preferenco function
is the quantity of real instructional services. Opera-
tionally, this would include the amount spent for teachers'
salaries and also perhaps other current classroom costs,
deflated by a price index. This assumnption means that
school boards do not know enough about the educational
production function to maximize school output directly.
Even if they knew the production function, they might not
be able to decide which outputs to maximize. So instead,
they try to maximize those real inputs which presumably
are most relevant to learniiig.
3. The price index for deflating instructional costs
from year to year is the same for all districts, and is
exogenons for both individual school boards and the state
as a whole. This assumption is theoretically unfortunate,
but was necessita ted by lack of accessible data on teachers'
salaries by school district.
4. The second main element in the preference function is
the current school tax rate, which enters the objective
function in a negative way. The justification for using
the tax rate instead of a budget constraint was given in
the previous chapter. The school tax rate is defined
simply as current school spending divided by the equalized
assessed value of local property, since in Massachusetts
virtually all local school revenues come from the property
tax. (Although school committees in Massachusetts do not
have separate taxing authority, and their budgets must pass
through the city council or town meeting, state law re-
quires that the school operating budget be approved intact. (1)
Thus the school committees, which are separately elected,
do have considerable fiscal autonomy in effect.)
5. School boards understand state and federal grant
formulas. They havo a fairly accurate idea of how much
aid they will get, and if there are matching grants they
know how many dollars of aid they will get for every dollar
they raise from local taxes. This assumption permits
the .quan ity of matching ai d to be substituted out of the
behavioral equation.
6. The probl em of determining current expendi tures is
separable from the determination of capital investments.
Furthermore, all current expenditures arc supported by
grants or local taxes, while all capital spending is
financed by borrowing.
7. School boards consider property values exogenous.
Empirically, this is not a bad assumption, because the
evidence indicates that the balanced-budget effect on pro-
perty values of increasing both local school spending and
local taxes by the same amount is approximately zero
anyway. (2)
8. School boards consider the number of pupils exogenous.
They therefore think in terms of expenditure per pupil.
The Objective Function of Local School Committees,
and the Massachusetts Aid Formula
Under these assumptions, a school board may have a
preference function of the general form
4.1 max f . . ; t (L,V) ; Z).
p
L = Local reimbursable expenditure per pupi-l in
net average membership;
g(L) = Total amount, as perceived by the school
board, of current expenditure per pupi1,
including grants;
M = Current overhead costs per pupil;
p = Price index for instructional costs
t = School tax rate, in dollars per thousand doll ars
of equalized assessed valuaijon;
V = Equalized assessed property value per pupil,
in thousands of dollars;
Z = A vector of demographic variables. (3)
Current expenditure per pupil from local source, L,
is the only control variable. Specifical-ly, it is "re-
imbursabl-e exp)end itures," as de fiied by Chapter 70 of the
state laws (see Appendix) , divided by net average membership
in local elementar': and secondary schools.
The function g (L) is the total amount, as perceived
by the school board, of current expenditure per pupil,
including state and federal grants, which results from a
given level of local. expenditure L. For school districts
in Massachusetts in both 1965-66 and 1968-69 the function
could be written in the form
4.2 g (L) = c 1 , + C
The coefficient c, includes matching grants, and c 2 represents
block grants.
In 1965-66, c = 1 because there were no matching
grants. All state and federal non-matching, general
purpose grants are lumped together and denoted by A. Thi s
amount is multiplied by a subjective coefficient q, so
that c2 = qA. This coefficient q, which is to be estimated,
measures the extent to which school committees perceive
block grants to be substitutable for locally raised revenues
(including matching grants). The coefficient would be
1.0 if block grants were perfect substitutes for revenue
raised locally. A value of q between zero and 1.0 would
indicate some, but less than perfect, substitution.
There could be two reasons why block grants might be
less than perfect substitutes for locally raised revenue.
One reason is that some block grants are categorical,
to be used only for specific purposes such as purchase of
audiovisual equipment. (4) Unless a district were already
spending a substantial amount on audiovisual equipment,
a federal grant for this purpose could not displace much
local spending.
A second reason why the estimate of q might be less
than 1.0 is that districts may hedge against the risk
that block grants will not come through. Massachusetts
towns prepare budgets on a calendar year basis (this will
change in 1972). When they are preparing next year's
budget, school committees seldom know exactly how much
they will get in block grants, because appropriations by
federal and state legislatures occur at various times
during the year. The uncertainty is presumably greater
about block grants than about matching grants, which are
determined by statutory formula in relation to a district's
own level of spending. To be on the safe side, therefore,
school committees probably estimate conservatively the
amount of block grants they will receive, and to compen-
sate they budget more of their own money than they really
need. Thus, q is partly an uncertainty discount factor
applied to block grants.
The model contains no coefficient like qI for matching
grants, because neither reason for the less than perfect
substitutability of non-matching grants would seem to
apply to matching grants. First, state matching grants
are not categorical. Second, there would be less uncer-
tainty about the amount of matching grants than about
block grants, because the matching ratio is determined by
statute, while the amount of block grants depends on each
year's legislative whim. Therefore the model assumes that
the perceived value of g(L) will differ from the actual.
amount only to the extent that there are block grants.
Returning to the total resources function g(L), the
definitions of ci and c 2 become much more complicated in
1968-69 because of the new state aid formula. Total
available resources per pupil as a function of local rein-
bursable expenditures L becomes
g(L) = c3 L + c 2 = [1 + (0.7)s(1 - d)(1 - d2)(1 - d7 )
+ (0.52S)d ]L + q[s(1 - d3(361d1 + 263d 23312
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Also, any district spending less than 80% of the
is nevertheless entitled to state matching as if
local reimbursable expenditures were exactly 80%
average. These stipulati-ons are expressed in the
tions of dI and d 2 '
4.5 1 if L > 1.1(462.50),
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d2 1 if L < 0.8(462.50),
0 otherwise
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An additional complication is that the state actual-lv
computes the amount of aid for each district in each calendar
year on the basis of local reimbursable expenditure in the
preceding fiscal year (school year). More precisely, the
amount of aid to which a district was entitled for July
through December 1968, the part of the 1968-69 school year
falling in the 1968 calendar year, depended on its reimburs-
able expenditure in the fiscal year (school year) 1966-67.
And the amount of aid for January through June 1969 depended
on reimbursable expenditure during 1967-68.
There would have been three possible ways to handle
this time lag in the model. One would have been to set up
the whole system as an explicitly intertemporal optimiza-
tion problem. The second would have been to use data
for previous years' to find the actual amount of state aid
in the current year, but still to treat the problem year by
year. The third way, and the one actually used, was to
pretend that reimbursable expendituro in all districts had
grown at the same rate as the average rate of growth for all
districts, which was known. Then the lag in state aid
could be handled simply by adjusting the state matching ratio
downward by a constant fraction for all districts. The
values of dl, d 2' and d,. were assumed to have been the same
in the preceding years as in 1968-69. This procedure means
that school boards eact as if state aid were based on
current expenditure, but they make a downard adjustment
in the matching ratio to account for the actual dependence
of state aid on expenditure in previous years, when the
level of spending was less than the current year.
In 1968-69 it was also necessary to make an additional
downward adjustment in the matching ratio because the state
was not yet raising enough revenue to fund fully the new
aid program: districts received only 67% of the aid to
which they were entitled by the formula.
To see the overall effect of all these constraints,
consider how equation 4.3 would work for a school district
which had about the average amounts of property value and
local reimbursable expenditure per pupil. Then s would be
about 0.35, and all the dummy variables would be zero.
But because of the downward adjustments due to the lag in
state aid and insufficient funding, total available resources
would be only about 1.245 (rather than 1.35) times reim-
bursable expenditure L, plus non-matching aid discounted by
the factor q.
A district with very large amounts of property value and
reimbursable expenditure per pupil would have s = 0.15,
and di = 1, d 2 = d3 = 0, so that total resources would
simply be locally raised reimbursable expenditure L;
plus the sum of block grants and 15% of $361 per pupil,
discounted by q. The $361 figure is 110% of the average
reimbursable expenditure of $462.50, discounted to allow
for the lag in state aid and the less than full funding.
This second example illustrates how any district spend ing
more than 1.10% or less than 80% of the average reimbursable
expenditure (d= 1 or d2 = 1) actually does not get any
matching grants at all, because a marginal change in its
reimbursable expenditure does not affect the amount of
state aid it receives.
As a final example of how equation 4.3 works, consider
any district in which federal grants plus state aid normally
computed would amount to more than 75% of the sum of federal
grants plus local reimbursable expenditure. This could
happen, for instance, in a "federally impacted" area.
Then d = 1, so total resources per pupil would be 1.525
times reimbursable expenditure L, plus 0.556 times q
times block grants. State aid is reduced to offset "ex-
cessive" federal aid. Also, since the state matching ratio,
s, no longer applies, the amount of state aid does not
depend on the value of district property.
Returning to the objective function 4.1, the rest of
the symbols have much simpler definitions. M represents
per pupil overhead costs , which are assumed to be the same
for all districts. This might mean all current expenses
other than teachers, or other than all classroom costs.
Since it is not self-evident what school boards really
consider overhead and what they consider productive
inputs, the value of M will be estimated as the cons ant
in the regression equation.
The price index p is based on teachers' salaries for
the state. In 1965-66 it was taken to be 1.0, and in
1968-69 it was 1.2, since teachers ' salaries rose 20%.
The local current school tax rate is simply defined as
4.8 t = L/V,
the ratio of local reimbursable expenditure to equali zed
property value.
In a previous specification of the model the local
tax rate included an index of state and federal taxes
for supporting aid to local schools. These taxes were
assumed to fall on each community approximately in propor-
tion to its total personal income. However, state and
federal. school taxes so measured had no discornible effect
on the fiscal behavior of the local school districts.
This is not surprising after all, because the local school
board has no political responsibility for taxes imposed
by higher levels of government, even if those taxes are
eventually put at the local school boards' disposal.
In other words, it apparently makes no difference to a
local school board whether the revenues to support state
and federal aid come from its own district or from else-
where.
Finally, Z represents a vector of demographic variables
which will affect the school board's willingness to impose
higher tax rates for the sake of hi gher total expenditures.
4.9 Z = YM, PRO, ED, POP, HO.
The first three measure socioeconomic status: YM is mean
family income; ED is median years of schooling of the adult
population; PRO is the proportion of the labor force em-
ployed as professional, technical, or kindred workers.
These measures of social sclass should be positively associat-
ed with a desire to spend more, as in the studies reported
in Chapter III. POP is total population, which is a proxy
for the greater organization and power of teachers' unions
in large districts, relative to individual taxpayers.
Thus POP should be associated with more pressure on the
school board to spend. Finally, 10 is the proportion of
homes that are owner -occupie(l, which, as in previous
studies, should correlate with stronger resistance to the
property tax, because a tax rise threatens homeowners but
not tenants with actual loss of capital. All this data,
unfortunately, is from the 1960 Census. (5)
Maximizing a Specific Form of the ObiectIve Function
to Derive the Behavioral Equati on
The school committee is assumed to maximize the objective
function in 4.1 with respect to the single policy variable
L. The first order condition, which determines the best L,
is
4.10 -f /p +d 0 ,
where by assumption the derivatives f > 0, f2 < 0
This is the general form of the behavi oral equation that is
to be estimated.
The presence of the price index p should not be taken
to mean that equation 4.10 is an orthodox demand function.
To the contrary, p has the same magnitude for 'every school
district. What will be estimated in the final version of
4.10 are the parameters of the preference function itself.
Parametrizing the preference function means postulating
a certain functional form. Under the assumption that the
level of spending chosen by the school board will maximize
the value of the preference function, some notion of
theoretically permissible forms may be obtained from the
second order condition for a maximum:
4.11 f],(dg-) 2/2 + 2 fl2 t2 2 + f 12L J1LdL 1 dL2
+ f2 d2) < 0
The following are sufficient conditions under which
inequality 4.11 will hold:
2 d 2 t4.12 fg (-) /p + f2 )L .: 0, and
-dL2 2< ,ac
4.13 f(d 2 /2 + 2fl2 g)(dt)/p + f dt 2 <
The functions g and t are already given in equations 4.2
and 4.8. Since both are linear in L, condition 4.12 holds
as an equality.
To satisfy 4.13, which is the condition for concave
indifference curves, there would be several simple forms
in which to write the preference function. For example
max m(I + no 
- ut + w log t
P p
max m( ) - nt (T1) - ut;
p p
max n log (') ut ; etc.
p
The coefficients m, n, u, and w are all assumed positive.
There is no a priori way to choose among the functional
forms of 4.1 that satisfy 4.13. The way to choose among
these theoretical ly permissible forms is to try different
ones, derive and estimate the behavioral ecluation for each,
and choose the .one that produces the best fit to the data.
Accordingly, two functional forms were tried. One was
max n(s U ) -t - ut.
p p
This form has the theoretically desirable feature that the
marginal utility of real, non-overhead expenditure (~ 1)
p
decreases when the tax rate t increases, and the marginal
disutility of the tax rate increases when the level of
spending increases. Since this is only an ordinal function,
it is permissible to normalize it by setting one of the
coefficients equal to unity. That is why the middle term
appears with no coefficient. Substituting g = c1 L +
and t = LT, and maximizing with respect to L produced the
behavioral equati on
L - (nV - c2  +
2- ci
M pu
- C
Although 4.14 has a pleasing linear form, it did not
give as good a fit to the data as did the behavioral equa-
tion based on the preference function
g-Mmxn( ) -
p
1 gT-M 2
2 ( )
2 p
Substituting again for t and g and differentiating gives the
behavioral equation
4.16 L =pn - c 2 + M
+- p iii Ic-V 2
This is the parametrized form of 4.10. Local spending L
will depend positively on the marginal preference for
real instructional inputs, measured by n; and L varies
inversely with the marginal disutility of the local tax
4.14
4.15 1 21 ut .2
rate, measured by u. Larger overhead M will mean larger
L, more block grants in c 2 will produce smaller L, and the
effect of changes in the price index p or the matching ratio
c 1 are uncertain.
Before estimating 4.16 or 4.14 it still remained to
specify how n and i depend on the characteristics of local
communities. After experimenting with different variables,
a good specification seemed to be
4.17 n = aIYM + a2 PRO + a3ED + a4POP
4.18 u = a5 HO.
The reasoning, to recapitulate, is that the school board's
desire for more instructional inputs should be positively
related to the commiunity's socioeconomic status as measured
by income, level of education, and the percentage in pro -
fessional occupations (since people in these occupations
would place more importance on academic training and
credentials) At mentioned above, district size also
correlates with the power of teachers' unions relative to
individual taxpayers, so large population would mean a
tendency to spend more in the classroom. On the other hand,
the disutility of the property tax rate should increase
with the proportion of owner-occupied homes, since a rise
in the tax rate threatens homeowners but not tenants with a
capital loss.
For 1965-66, therefore, equation 4.16 was finally
estimated in the form
4.19 L = aiYM+a2PRO+a3ED+a4POP + M - qA
1 + aHO/V2
For 1968-69., the equation was
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Results of .the Estimation
The estimation made use of a nonlinear regression
program recently developed at MIT for the
Table 4.1 displays
TROLL system. (6)
the results.
TABLE 4. 1
Coefficient and .
Vari able
a1
income
% professionals
a3
education of
a-4
population
adults
1965-66
(standard errors
0.027
(0 . 010)
538
(141)
9.52
(5.54)
0.000087
(0.000071)
1968-69
in parentheses)
0.024
(0.010)
510
(161)
16.86
(6.57)
0.000347
(0.000099)
overhead spending
139.76
(61.93)
q 0.680
block grant discount factor (0.132)
a 5  64.7
% homes owner-occupied (10. 8)
R 2 0.70
Sample size 157
The coefficients all have the predicted
values of f2 are quite satisfactory for cross-sectional
regressions, and they compare favorably
by Michelson
1968-69
with those obtained
and Grubb, who analyzed the same sample in
with a linear, multi-equation model. By the s e
measures, the model fits the data well in both years,
despite the drastic change in the state aid formula.
tO
Go
142
(82
.52
.92)
.601
.1.03)
0
(0
111.8
(20.9)
0.76
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It is worth commenting in particular about the estimate
of q. School boards receiving an additional dollar of non-
matching aid will reduce their own current expenditure by
the estimated value of q divided by the denominator in
4.19 or 4.20. On average, these denominators are about
1.1 to 1.3 (V is measured in thousands of dollars). So
the fact that the estimate of q is between 0.5 and 0.7
means that the reduction in local current expenditure from
an extra dollar of non-matching aid will be around 45 to
65 cents.
The estimate of overhead costs, M, suggests that what
school committees regard as overhead is anything not spent
on teachers. In 1965-66 the estimated value of M was
about $140, or 33.4 % of the mean value of L, which was
$419. For the'state as a whole, the total expenditure on
teachers was 61.2% of total current expenditure, which is
remarkably close to 100% minus 33.4%. For 1968-69 lack
of state data prevented making a comparable calculation.
A Chow test was performed to test the significance
of the difference between the two sets of coefficients in
Table 4.1, and the hypothesis that the two sets are the
same can be rejected at the 0.05 level. But most of
these coefficients correspond to variables for which only
1960 data was available, despite the fact that the true
demographic characteristics of the communities did change
from 1960 to 1965-66, and from 1965-66 to 1968-69. In
theory, the behavi or of local school boards depends on the
current characteristics of their constituents. Since the
CD
relationship of current characteristics to the 1960 data
undoubtedly changed between 1965-66 and 1968-69, the
coefficients based on 1960 data should be different in
the two years. If current data had been available, there
would presumably have been less difference, if any, be-
tween the two sets of coefficients. Furthermore, even if
there were some change over time in the coefficients based
on current data, this would not imply that school boards
in any given year would reveal inconsistent preferences
in making decisions under different aid formulas. In
short, the difference between the two sets of coefficients
in Table 4.1 certainly does not invalidate the model as
a basis for predicting responses bo hypothetical grant
plans in a given year.
In addition to looking at the coefficients themselves,
the model can be appraised in two other ways. First,
the estimates imply a different preference function
and set of indifference curves for each district, and
examples of these can be examined. Second, some of the
qualitative and quantitative implications for school dis-
trict fiscal behavior can be assessed.
Measuring the Effect of SES on Willingness to Pay for
Schools
The basic idea of the simulation model is to make use
of an estimated preference function for each school district.
It is therefore appropriate to ask whether the preferences
implied by the estimates in Table 4.1 are reasonable.
Table 4.2 considers two districts, Milton and New Bedford.
Milton is a wealthy residential suburb of Boston; -New
Bedford is a decaying port city on Massachusetts' southern
coast. They are typical rather than extreme examples.
Table 4.2 contains the 1960 demographic data for the two
districts. It also shows the computed values of n and u,
from equations 4.17 and 4.18, using the 1968-69 estimated
coefficients.
TABLE 4.2
New Bedford Milton
Mean family income (YM) 4,930 7,192
Proporti on employed as professionals (PRO) 0.063 0. 204
Median education of adults (ED) 8.4 12.6
Population (POP) 102,477 26,375
Proportion of hOmps owner-occupied (110) 0.391 0.864
n = 0.024YM + SOPRO
+ 16.86ED + 0.000347POP 328.0 498.7
u = 1ll1.8HO 43.7 96.6
Figure 4.1 depicts a set of indifference curves for
each district, representing combinations of total resources
g and tax.rate t which produce the same value of the
district's preference function. Except at levels of g
below $367 per pupil, the indifference curves for New
Bedford are steeper than for Milton. This means that
in this range, the New Bedford school board would require
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a larger increment of expenditure per pupil to induce it
to raise the tax rate by a given a-mount. Algebraically,
the slope of an indifference curve, from 4.15, is
dg. putp g .) Given the estimated values of n and
dT np - g -M )
u, this quantity is greater for New Bedford than for Milton,
in the relevant range of g. Thus the estimated coeffi-
cients confirm the hypothesis that the socioeconomic
characteristics of the population determine the district's
willingness to tax itself for the sake of more expenditure
per pupil. This effect of SES on preferences is separate
and distinct from the effect of wzeaAth per se on the
ability to get a certain amount of expenditure from a given
tax rate.
Measuring the i-VFferent Stimulus from Matching and
Block Grants
The theoretical consensus reported in Chapter III is
that increasing either block grants or matching grants
will normally lead to more total expenditure on the subsi-
dized service, but less expenditure from local sources,
as grants are partially substituted for local revenues.
It can be shown by differentiating equation 4.16 that the
present model agrees with these theoretical conclusions.
Most previous theory also asserts that replacing a
dollar of block grants with a dollar of matching money
will stimulate greater local, and there Fore total, expendi-
ture on the subsidized service. However, the model as
estimated implies that this is not necessarily true.
reason is that the parameter q. i s cstimated to be less
than 1.0: because of their somotimos categorical nature
and their uncertainty relative to matching grants,
block grants are treated as less than perfect substitutes
for revenues produced by local efforts.
To see how this works algebraically, recall that the
total amount of aid received by a district is (c -1)L + A,
the sum of matching grants plus block grants. Now consider
what would happen to L if A were reduced and (c-1)L
increased by the same amount. That is , what would be the
sign of dL if
4.21 dA = -d[(c - 1)L] ?
First of all,
4.22 dL = dc + 3c dc1) C c2  2
But c2 = qA, so
dc 2 = ctdA = -qd[(c 1 1-)L] = -q[(c - 1)dL + Ldc 1.
Substituting 4.23 into 4.32 and solving for dL gives
L-qL )dc
Acl Dc2 1
DL1 + q(c - 1) U
c2
It can be shown that the denominator of 4.24 is always
positive.
4.25
Therefore dL is positive if and only if
DL > qL 2L
-c ID C2
After substi tuting for L, L , and 4 from 4.16, condition
ac 1 Dc.2
H
4.23
4 *
The
dL =
4.25 becomes
4.26 p2 U/c2v2 >1 -q.
If q = 1, condition 4.26 would always be true, so
dL would always be positive, if matching funds were sub-
stituted for an equal amount of block grants. But with
the estimate of q = 0.6, it is quite conceivable that 4.26
might not hold in some districts wiherc u were high and c V
low enough. In point of fact, condition 4.26 probably does
hold for all districts in the sample. Nevertheless, the
difference between matching and block grants is less clear
cut in practice than in theory. The qualitative conclusions
from pure theory are attenuated, and sometimes may even
be reversed, by institutional realities.
Conclusion
In order to permit simulation of the local response
to hypothetical state aid formulas, the model presented
here has tried to do two things that previous models have
not done. First, it has parametrized the preferences of
local school boards in such a way that the parameters can
be estimated from observed data on local spending. These
preference parameters were found to depend on the socio-
economic characteristics of local communities. Upper-middle-
class districts, identified by occupation, income, and
education, are more willing to raise the local tax rate
for the sake of spending more per pupil in local schools.
This greater willingness to spend is separate and distinct
from wealthier districts advantage in sheer ability
to pay.
To explain fully why upper-middle-class commlunities
are more willing to raise the tax rate for the sake of more
expenditure is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
two complementary hypotheses suggest themselves.. First,
a given property t-ax rate represents less of a burden
in wealthier communities, where a larger proportion of
total wealth is held in the form of securities and other
assets not subject to the local property tax. The pro-
perty tax, in short, is regressive in terms of wealth,
whether or not it is regressive in terms of permanent income.
An additional reason why upper-middle-class districts have
a stronger propensit)y to tax themselves for schools could
well be that the schools as they now exist are best
suited for this class. Studios cited in Chapter I found
that the rate of return to educat ion is higher for whites
than for blacks; given the correlation between race and class
in this country, it also seems likely that the rate of return
to formal schooling for the upper-middle-cl ass would
exceed that for the lower classes. Certainly academic
credentials are more valuable in professional, technical,
and managerial careers than in blue-collar occupations
where on-the-job training is more important. Education
is also essential in the upper-middle-class style of
life: in part, their status depends on it. Since the
schools as presently constituted serve the purposes of the
wealthier class, it is only rational for them to be more
willing to pay.
The second innovation in the model has been to incorpo-
rate the state matching formula in such a way that matching
aid is embodied in the very structure of the estimating
equation, rather than appearing as a separate variable.
This approach produced a good fit to the data in two years
when the state aid formula was very different. The explan-
atory power of the model is at least as great as a linear,
multi-equation model which used the same data. Finally,
this formulation indicated that the difference between
matching and block grants in stimulating local expenditure
may be less than qualitative theories have asserted.
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CHAPTER V
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUALI ZING FORMULAS IN
MASSACIUS ETTS
This chapter reports two kinds of experiments with
state aid to public schools in Massachusetts. The first
experiment was historical: in 1966 the formula for dis-
tributing stateoaid to local school districts changed
fundamentally. The change in its effects on the distri-
bution of educational resources will be described. The
second kind of experiment is a simulation of a hypothetical
new formula for distributing state aid. (1)
The Situation in 1965-66
The formula for distributing general.-purpose aid for
local. schools, in 1965-66 had been handed down in 1948,
when the Massachusetts legislature grandly announced a
program "To promote the equalization of educational opportunity
in public schools of the commonwealth and the equalization of
the burden of the cost of schools to the respective towns..."
(2) The basic formula gave each district $130 for every
child between the ages of seven and sixteen, minus 0.006
times the total equalized value of real estate in the dis-
trict. Wealthier towns would thus receive less state
aid per pupil; a district containing taxable property worth
more than $21,700 per ~child of school age would get nothing
under the formula--except that the act explicitly guaranteed
every district a minimum amount equal to the amount of
state aid received in 1948.
Although the 1948 Act appears to promise state grants
on the order of at least $30 to $50 per pupil for the
average district, by 1965-66 the program was providing on
average less than $7 per pupil in regular day schools
across the state. The amount of aid may have shrunk
because state taxes did not pump enough money into the
Massachusetts School Fund. Also, growth of locally taxable
property may have choked off state aid under the formula,
despite the provision in the 1948 Act that the $130
"foundation" levrel would grow one dollar for every hundred
million increase in total statewide property value.
Whatever the reason, general-purpose state aid in 1965-66
was a mere pittance.
School districts in 1965-66 did receive some other
state and federal grants for goeneral current expenses.
In addition to tLhe nearly $7 per pupil in general -purpose
aid from the state, local school districts in Massachusetts
received on average another $5 or so from the state for
more specific purposes, plus roughly $20 per pupil from the
federal government. Much of the federal aid came as block
grants, either for "federally impacted areas" under
P.L. 874 or for districts with concentrations of low-
income students under E.S.E.A. Title I. (3) Together these
various state and federal grants represented roughly 7% of
the average district.'s current spending.
The results of this system of grants are displayed
in the first column of Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The local tax
ratcs in these tables are local "reimbursable expenditures"
Cdefined in Appendix) , per thousand dollars of equalized
property value. The figures on total expenditure per
pupil include local reimbursable expenditure, plus state
TABLE 5.1
simulated 1968-69
pure
actual actual estimated percentage ultimate
1965-66 1968-69 1968-69 equalizing equalizing
mean total
expen diture
per pupil 454.54 592.52 600.18 612.57 581.76
mean local
tax rate 18.07 17.79 17.46 11.94 15.01
vari ance
of log of .067 .028 .020 .014 .002
total ex-
penditure
per pupil
and federal grants. The amounts of equalized property
value per pupil are in thousands of dollars. Finally,
the variance of the logarithm of total expenditure is used
as the measure of variation because it is not affected by
linear transformations of the data: for instance, if every
district spent twice as much because costs doubled, the
variance of the log of expenditure would not change.
Comparing the districts with highest and lowest
levels of total expenditure clearly reveals the inadequacy
of state aid in 1965-66. While Weston and Lexington
enjoyed more than $700 per pupil-, Abington and Middleborough
somehow made do with less than $200. Incredible though
they may seem, these extremely low levels of spending are
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TABLE 5.2
actual
1965-66
5 districts L6xington
with highest 715.85
total expend- 28.6
iture per pupil: 23.5
total expend-
iture, Weston
local tax 706.84
rate (in 20.6
dollars per 33.5
thousant),
and equalized . Brookline
property 678.85
value (in 9.7
thousands). 68.4
Swampscott
671.09
16.5
Welle sl ey
659.20
15.6
41.3
actual
1968-69
Brookline
1032.98
12.5
73.4
Westweood
919. 43
23.7
33.0
Swamps cott
871. 75
20.1
38.6
Wes ton
857.59
19.9
Wellosley
843. 03
17.6
41.6
s imulated
pure
percent age
equali zing
Weston
849
16
40
Boston
833
16
21
53
6
1
47
2
4
Longmn eadow
805.73
15.7
30.9
Welles leV
802.28
15.6
Newton
801.73
15.6
37.3
1968-69
ultimate
equalizing
92 districts
have total
expenditure
= $600;
5 districts
with highest
local tax
rate:
New ton
59.4
Weston
42.9
Westwood
36 .0
Boston
3S.0
Longmeadow
33.8
0 A s # *
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TABLE 5.2 (Continued)
actual
1965-66
5 districts
with lowest
total exoend-
iture per pu-
pil: total
expenditure,
local tax
rate (in
dollars per
thousand),
and equal-
ized pro-
pertv value
(in thou-
sands).
Middleborough
128.69
22.3
5.3
Abington
161. 30
24.9
6.0
Millville
288.68
16.5
16.5
Tyngsborough
321.05
9.8
Huds on
331.91
17.2
17.6
actual
1968-69
N. Brookfield
349 .26
11.1
19.3
Millville
369.67
15.6
14.5
Hudson
408.36
13.6
19.2
Webster
421.57
8.8
37.9
Bellingham
441.65
19.1
14.7
simulated
pure
percentage
equalizing
Blacks tone
495.07
9.7
18.6
Winch en don
499.80
9.8
13.8
Wes tport
501.18
9.8
35.6
Webster
505.81
37.9
Provincetown
506.10
9.9
79.4
1968-69
percentage
equalizing
Westport
508.64
7.2
35.6
Webster
514.84
6.9
37.9
Winchendon
517.47
5.7
13.8
Provincetown
517.99
6.5
79.4
Ware
519.86
6.2
29.4
A I i
consistent with the extremriely small aiounts of property
value per pupil in these districts. Tndeed, this is the
main problem: given the paltry amounts of state and federal
aid, local districts had to rely on their own property
tax to support the schools. Obviously, wealthy districts
could raise more money this way. The five districts
with the highest total expenditure had property value per
pupil ranging from $40,000 to $68,400, while the five
lowest ranged from $5,280 to $17,600. The clincher is that
the five highest-spending districts could raise two to
five times as many dollars per pupil as the five lowest,
but could still get away with a lower average total tax
rate: 18.2 compared with 22.5 dollars per thousand.
NESDEC in 1961-69
The obvious need for more adequat e-both more sub-
stantial and more equalizing--state aid to local schools
prompted passage in 1966 of a brand-new distribution formula,
named the NESDEC formula in honor of the New England
School Development Council, which invented it. (4) The
NESDEC formula is spelled out in Chapter 70 of the state
laws, which is included as an Appendix for readers who
enjoy translating legal prose into algebra.
To recapitulate, the NESDEC formula is a variant of
"percentage equalizing," the pure form of which appeared
in Chapter II as Plan 8 in Table 2. 1. Pure percentage
equalizing gives all districts the same linear opportunity
frontier, by setting
5.1 g(L) = kL/V,
where V is equal ized value of property per pupil in the
district. In terms of equation 4.2, c2 = 0, and ci = k/V,
where k is the same constant for all districts. The result
is to make total expenditure per pupil, g(L), strictly
proportional to the local school tax rate L/V. Every
district gets to spend exactly k times its local tax
rate--no more, no less. (Equation 5.1, unlike equation
2. 5, ignores state taxes paid by the district, since the
school boards themselves seem to ignore them.)
For total resources to be independent of local wealth
as measured by V, state aid per pupil, S, would be
5.2 S = (1 - mV/9)g - F = (1 - mV/V)(L + S + F) - F.
Here m is a constant between zero and 1.0 with the same
value for all districts, V is property value per pupil in
the average district, and F is per pupil federal aid, which
is assumed to be exogenous and known. Then
5.3 S = (In- m/5)L - F, so thatmv/V
5.4 g(L)g L + S + F = (V/m)(L/V),
which corresponds to equation 5. 1 with k = /in. Thus the
state aid formula in ecluation 5.3 makes total resources
per pupil a function of the local tax rate alone.
However, the NESDEC formula is not percentage equalizing
in this pure form. First of all, instead of formula 5.2
NESDEC has
5.5 S = (1 - mV/V)L,
with m = 0.65. So for the average district (V = Y),
state aid is 35% of local spending, not 35% of total-
spending, which includes the amount of state aid itself.
Since state aid is larger in poorer districts, NESDEC
is less equalizing than pure percentage equalizing would be.
In addition, the NESDEC formula includes three
constraints, which contributed so much to the complexity
of the model in Chapter IV. (See 4.4, 4.5, 4.6.) To
repeat, the first constraint says that the state matching
percentage will be no more than 75% in any di strict, and
no less than 15%. This constraint is extremely important.
Without it, the matching percentage (1 - 0.65V/V) would
be less than 15% for all districts with property value per
pupil more than 0.85V/0.65, or $33,600 in 1968-69. In
the sample of 157 districts , 33 had at least this much
property value. The wealthiest of these, in the absence
of constraint 5.8, would actually have been due for ne-
gative subsidies according to equation 5.5. This constraint
therefore gives many of the wealthier districts more
state matching than they would get from pure percentage
equal i zing.
The second constraint holds that a district which spends
more than 110% of the state average from local sources
will not receive any state matching on the excess over
110%; but if a district spends less than 80% of the state
H
H
average, it will get state matching as if it spent exactly
80%. The result is that school districts which spend more
than 110% or less than 80% of the state average simply
receive block grants, equal to the appropriate state
matching percentage multiplied by 0.8L or 1.IL. So for
districts outside the middle range of reimbursable expendi-
ture, NESDEC really provides not matching but block grants.
NESDEC's third constraint is that state plus federal
aid may be no more than 75% of local spending plus federal
aid. This constraint applies mainly to "federally impacted"
districts, such as those containing military bases, where
federal P.L. 874 pays the consequent local school costs.
What actually came out of all these constraints and
coefficients? Refer again to Tables 5.1 and 5.2, where the
second column presents data for 1968-69. One clear result
is that the more generous program of state assistance
did raise the average level of total expenditure per pupil.
State aid, which was roughly 3% of toal current expendi-
ture in 1965-66, shot up to about 20% in 1968-69 under
NESDEC. This spurred a 30% increase in the average total
expenditure per pupil, from $455 to $593. Since teacher
salaries in general rose only about 20% in this period,
there was an apparent increase in the amount of real
instructional resources per pupil.
The increase in total expenditure, moreover, was
financed mostly by state (and federal) aid. Expenditure
from local sources, which averaged $418 per pupil in 1965-66,
rose only to $456 in 1968-69. So local districts contributed
only $38 to the $138 rise in total expenditure per pupil;
state (and federal) grants paid the remaining $100.
In fact, NESDEC was not a very potent stimulus to local
tax effort. Because assessed valuation rose, the average
local school tax rate in the sample actually dropped
slightly, from $18.07 to $17.49 per thousand dollars of
equalized assessed pToperty value. This is good news to
those people, including most local public officials, who
always vicedd NESDEC as a devi cC for shifting the burden
of local school costs from the local property tax to
the state sales and income taxes. On the other hand, it
might alarm those who deem state aid inefficient unless
it stimulates local fiscal effort.
As an equali zer, the NECSDE formula produced mixed
results. (5) Table 5.1 shows that the variance of the
logarithm of total expenditure per pupil in the 1-57 sample
school districts fell from 0.067 in 1965-66 to 0.028 in
1968-69. These numbers measure variation in the ratio
between the sample observations and the geometric mean,
so the decrease indicates that the level of expenditure in
high-spending districts became a smaller multiple of
expenditure in low-spending districts under NESDEC. Roughly
speaking, if the logarithm of expenditure has an approximate-
ly normal distribution, then these variances imply that,
while two thirds of the districts differed no more than
30% from the average expenditure per pupil in 1965-66,
NESDEC reduced the variation so that two-thirds differed
no more than 20% from the average in 1968-69. At the
extremes, the ratio of Lexington's total expenditure per
pupil to Middleborough's in 1965-66 was 5.57; in 1968-69
the ratio of Brookline's to North Brookfield's was only
2.96.
On the other hand, the absolute difference between per
pupil expenditure in Brookline and in North Brookfiold
for 1968-69 was $684; in 1965-66 the di fference betieen
Lexington and Mi ddleborough had been only $587. So while the
spread between highest and lowest decreased in ratio terms,
it increased almost $100 in absolute amount. Furthermore,
Table 5.2 indicates that the highest-spending districts
still tended to have equalized property value per pupil
well in excess of the $25,675 state average, while the
lowest-spending districts generally had less than average
property per pupil. It is true that the highest-spending
districts taxed themselves at somewhat higher rates than
the lowest. But this merely suggests than an effective
equalizing formul a must take into account the stron'er
propensities of weal thier districts to spend money on h scool~s
It is symptomatic of N3SDEC' s shortcoming as an equalization
formula that Brookline, Swampscott, and Wellesley all had
higher school tax rates in 1968-69 than in 1965-66, while
Hudson and Milliville actually reduced their local tax
effort in response to the new formula. Apparently NESDEC
failed. to promote equality in. expenditure per pupil be-
cause it of fored stronger incentives to rich districts
than to poor ones.
TABLE 5.3
New
Bedford Milton
average
i n1
sample
total expenditure per pupil, 1965-66
local tax rate, 1965-66
total expenditure per pupil, 1968-69
local tax rate, 1968-69
simulated values, 1968-69:
total expenditure per pupil,
percentage equalizing
local tax rate,
percentage equalizing
total expenditure per pupil
ultimate equalizing
local tax rate,
ultimate equalizing
property value perepil 1968-69
(in thousands)
Property value per pupil, 1965-66
383.03 560.71 418.58
13.75 10.42 18.07
529.77 699.14 592.52
16.50 11.23 17.49
525.83 711.35 612.57
10.25 13.85 11.94
527.56 600.00 581.76
9.39 27.66 15.01
20.52 56.54 25.675
22.02 48.30
Figure 5.1 shows how NESDEC in fact does glive strong -
er incentive to a wealthier district. The lines in Figure
5.1 are opportunity frontiers for two districts, Milton and
New Bedford. The significance of opportunity frontiers
was discussed in Chapter II. In Figure 5.1, point Bl
denotes the combination of local tax rate and total expendi-
turc per pupil chosen by New Bedford's school committee
The line through BI is the opportunity fron-in 1965-66.
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tier New Bedford faced in that year. Since there were
no matching grants in 1965-66, the slope of this line is
22.02, the amount (in thousands) of property value per
pupil. And the intercept is the amount of state and fed-
eral aid, $80 per pupil. Similarly, Ml marks Milton's
local tax rate and total per pupil expenditure in 1965-66,
and the line through M1 was Milton's opportunity frontier
in that year. Its intercept is about $23 lower than
New Bedford's, but its slope is much steeper, so at tax
rates greater than one dollar per thousand Milton's frontier
is higher than New Bedford's. That is why Milton could get
$178 per pupil more than New Bedford in 1965-66, but with
a lower tax rage (M1 is northwest of Bl.). For comparison,
point Al represents the average tax rate and total expendi-
ture in 1965-66 for all 157 districts.
The more generous provision of state aid under NFSDEC
pushed up the opportunity frontier for every district. B2
denotes New Bedford's tax rate and total expenditure in
1968-69, 112 is Milton's and A2 again is the average for all
districts in the sample. These three points all lie
above their corresponding points in 1965-66. Concomitantly,
the frontier through B2 lies above that through Bl; the
same for M2 and Ml. The kinks and j ags in the new frontiers
express NESDEC's several constraints. However, the most
important feature of these frontiers is that, over the
relevant range, the NESDEC frontier lies no greater distance
above the 1965-66 frontier for New Bedford than for Milton.
For tax rates from 9 to 12, the line through M2 lies aout
$85 above the l-ine through M1. With tax rates from 1-3 to
17, the line through B2 also lies only about $90 above
the frontier through Bl. NESDEC therefore did not even
offset the growth in Milton's tax base relative to New
Bedford's. As a result, between 1965-66 and 1968-69
New Bedford's opportunitios did not improve any more than
Milton's. This illustrates how NESDEC failed as an
equalizer.
Simul ati on
The remainder of this chapter will describe the simu-
lation of two hypothetical programs for distributing state
aid to local school districts. The purpose of the first
simulation is actually to prodict, the effects of a pure
percentage eqjualizing formula. The second simulation
will demonstrate how the mo(el can be used to find the
"best" state aid pogra1, once the objectives are defined.
The first step in the simulation procedure is to ex-
press the new state aid formula in terms of the total
resources function, equation 4.2. In the present instance,
pure percentage equalizing means g(L) = kL/V, so cl = k/V,
and c 2 = 0. The parameter k was set at 51.3, so that the
average district, which had V = 25.675, would have c1 = 2.
That is, the marginal matching ratio would be 100% for a
district with the average amount of assessed valuation.
This is more than the 35% provided by NESDEC. But the
increase in the average matching ratio is partially offset
by el-iminating the lower limit on the matching ratio,
by which NESDEC guaranteed that no district would be
matched at less than 15%.
The next step is to substitute the hypothetical
valuos of c and c2 into the basic behavioral equati on
4.16, along with the estimated 1968-69 coefficients from
Table 4.1 and the exogenous data for each district. This
yields the estimated amount of local expendi ture per pupil
by district under the hypothetical program. Calculat ing
total expenditure and the local tax rate is then trivial.
Table 5.1 displays the results of this simulation in
column four. The index of variation here should be com-
pared with column three rather than with column two.
Column three is based on est-imated local expenditure
computed from the regression equation 4.20. The variation
in total expenditure based on this computation is therefore
the variati on that can be explained by the model as a
result of demiographic differences between local districts.
But this explained variation is only about 75% of the total
about 25% remains unexplained by the model. The simula-
tion results also leave out this unexplained variation,
so they understate the amount ofvariation that would actually
occur if the hypothetical formulas were really tried.
Therefore the variation in the simulated results must be
compared with the estimated variation in column three,
rather than with the actual variation in column two.
Pure percentage equali zing apparently would accomplish
substantial but by no means complete equalization of total
expenditure per pupil. Table 5.1 shows a reduction in the
index of explainable variation from 0.020 to 0.014. This
means that two-thirds of the districts would spend ithin
about 12% of the average amount per pupil compared to 15%
under NESDEC (referring here to column three) . However,
Table 5.2 shows the range of variation in spending would
still be large. Several districts spend only $500 per pupil
or less, while others enjoy $800 or more. For Milton and
New Bedford, the difference is $127 per pupil.
To see why such differences persist, refer back to the
estimated. indifference curves in Figure 4.1, Chapter TV.
The straight line in this picture is the same as the
percentage-equalizing frontier in Figure 5.1. (This
frontier involves no block grants, so there is no difference
between the actual amount of total resources and the amount
perceived by the local authorities, because the block
grant discount factor, q, does not apply. ) Milton's
indifference curves are tangent to the common frontier
at a higher point, because Milton's richer, more educated,
upper-middle-class voters are more willing to raise the
tax rate for the sake of more expenditure per pupil.
As suggested above, this probably reflects the regressivity
of the property tax, as well as the greater importance of
formal education in the work and life of the middle class.
Whatever the exact underlying reasons are, the simula-
tion strongly suggests that even pure percentage equali-
zing would not erase the influence of sociocconomic status
on per pupil exponditure.
To compensate for the effect of sociocconomi c status
on the propensity to spend, it would be possible to provide
stronger incentives for poor districts than for wealthier
ones. As suggested in Chapter II, the state could adjust
the opportunity frontiers to be higher or steeper for
poorer districts. This would induce poorer districts to
spend rela-tively more, and would reduce the correlation
between socioeconomic status and expenditure per pupil
At the extreme, it would even be possible to adjust
the frontier to approach compilete equality of expenditures
per pupil. Some people may object to this idea on the grounds
that eliminating all variati on in expenditures, some of
which is attributable to "legitimate" differences in tastes
and not to so cioeconomic status , would thus elimate
free choice ; the baby would be thrown out with the bath.
Moreover, as a technical matter, if the goal were complete
equalization of expenditure, then it would be easier to
accomplish this by complete state assumption of all school
costs, rather than pretending to maintain the fiscal autonomy
of local districts.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to show, how the model -
can be used to find an optimal state aid program once the
objectives have been stated. In this instance, lot the
objective be simply to induce all districts to choose the
exact same level of total expondituro per pupil. To derive
the formula, start by sotting every district's total
resources equal to soeie target:
5..6 ciL + c2 = T,
where T is the target level of total expenditure for all
districts. The desired values of cl and c 2 for each dis-
trict are then found by simply taking the estimated equa-
tion 4.16 as an cxact description of what determines local
spending, and substituting the right-hand side of 4.16
for L in 5.6. This will give one equation in two
unknowns, cl and c2, meaning that there would be an infinite
number of combinations of ci and c 2 that could induce all
districts to choose the identical amount of total expendi-
ture T. To find a unique formula, it is necessary to
constrain either cl or c 2 . One possibility would b to
set c = 1, so that there would be no matching grants
All grants would be blocl grants. Solving for c2 then
g i yve s
5.7
gives
S (+161110/V 2 ) T -14 2 .5 -0 0 289Y-612 . 2PRO- 20. 23D-0 . 4173PP
0 2 1611 H//V
Since c2 = qA, this determines the required amount of the
block grant, A. For wealthy districts A could be negative.
The formula therefore allows each district to spend whatever
it raises from local taxation, plus or minus the block
grant.
If formula 5.7 were ever applied in practice, local
expenditure must presumably be constrained to be non-negative.
Otherwise distri cts might actu;ally tak block grants in ex-
cess of T per pupil, and simply pass out the excess to
local taxpayers as a negative tax. Since the aim of this
program is not to subsidize local taxpayers but to equal-
ize expenditure per pupil, the statc would presumably want
to set a maximum block grant equal to T, and require that
any local district receiving a block grant must spend it
all on schools, not pass any of it back as a tax rebate.
Another way to get perfect equality would be to use
the matching parameter c instead of the lump sum c 2  To
find the necessary value of c for each district, set c2 = 0.
Then substituting equation 4.16 into 5.6 and solving gives
5.8
\r2 (14 2 . 5- 0. 0 289YM+ 61.2 . 2 0PR+20. 23lED+0 . 4173POP-T)
Making this ope-ational as a state aid formula would simply
require solving
5.9 S = T - L - F = (cl - 1)L - F.
This formula would adjust the amount of state aid to equate
the sum of state and federal aid wi th the difference be-
tween the target T = cL and the amount 1 raised locally.
If the amount raised locally exceeded the target, then state
plus federal aid would have to be negative. But c1 is
always positive, though less than 1.0 for wealthier dis-
tricts, so every district would still obtain a higher level
of total expenditure by measuring its own local expenditure.
State a id would never take away all of the incentive to
increase local taxation.
Simulation of formula 5.8 produces few surpriscs,
since the derivation of c, in 5.8 already made use of the
simulation equation 4.16. The main question for simu-
lation is the tradeoff betweon equalization and the level
of the target expenditure. In order to produce an average
level of total spending comparable to the actual average of
$593 in 1968-69, the target T for each district was set
equal to the lesser of $600 per pupil, or (142.5 + 0.02 89YM
+ 612.2FRC) + 20.23ED + 0.4173POP) - 10. As reported in
Tables S.] and 5.2, 92 of the 157 districts came out at
the $600 level of total expenditure. In the remaining
districts, the lowest total expenditure was $.508.64. The
overall average was $581. 76, only slightly less than the
actual average in 1968-69. At this level of total ex-
penditure tlc index of variation could be reduced all the way
to 0.002, which means that roughly two -thir ds of the
districts would be within 5% of the average expenditure
per pupil. In Figure 5.1, points B5 and MS mark the new
positions of New Bedford and Milton. The spread in spending
is sharply reduced. Clearly, formula 5.8 can produce very
substantial equalization at the prevailing average level of
per pupil expenditure.
Conclusion
The California court ruling in Serrano v. Priest,
which has already been cited as precedent of Van Dusart z
v. Hatfield and may soon become precedent in other states
as well, declares unconstitutional any system of public
school finance in which thc quality of a child's education,
as measured by expenditure per pupil, depends on the
wealth of parents and neighbors. The California court was
strongly influenced by an amicus curriae brief filed by
John Coons and Stephen Sugarman, and by the earlier book
written by these two and William Clune. (6) These writers
propose a remedial principle called "power equalizing",
which calls for distributing state aid such that any two
districts with the same tax rate are guaranteed the same
amount of expendi ture per pupil, regardless of differences
in the local amount of taxable wealth. As explained in
Chapter II, this means that all districts share the same
opport unity frontier. Percentage equalizing, where the
common frontier is a stra i ght line, is one form of power
equalizing.
The mai n finding reported in this chapter is that,
because communities with higher socioeconom-i c status, have
a stronger propensity to pay for schools, the correlation
between wealth and expenditure per pupil will persist
even under percentage equalizing. It is likely that the
correlation would persist under any form of power equali-
zing, because no form of power equalizing would actually
compensate for differences in tastes related to socio-
economic status.
This finding is a fact, the validity of which rests
upon the accuracy of the econometric model in identifying
the determinants of local expenditure. The implications of
the finding, however, involve question of value. There is
a judicial question: if the correlation between wealth and
expenditure persists in a power-equalized system because wealth
is related to tastes, does Serrano imply the system is
therefore unconstittiti onal ? Beyond this there is a moral
and political question: which differences in tastes
are "legitinato" expressions of free choice, and which are
responses learned in an environment of unequal opportun-
ityv?
This chapter also showed that, although state aid in
Massachusetts historically has failed to accomplish its
stated purpose of equalizing educationalII. opportunity,
this fai lure cannot be a tt ributed to technical impossibili tv.
Technically, it would be ent-irely feasible, even with
autonomous school districts, to reduce inequality in
expenditure per pupil all the way to zero. Complete
state assumpti on of school costs would of course be an
easier way to equalize expenditure, but at the cost of
destroying local autonomy. The compensatory formulas
presented in this chapter demonstrate that local decision-
making is not incompatible with coma omplete
equalization of expenditure per pupil. Indeed, districts
with lower socioeconomic status presumably could be induced
even to spend more.
If full equalization or even more is feasible, why has
it not happened? Apparently the system is expressing other
objectives in addition to equalization. The problem of
how to deal with these other objectives is the topic of
the final chapter.
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effects of different formulas for clistlibuting state
aid. Andire Daniere's Cost Benefit Analysis of General
PuTnose State School-Al- ~TFlTas i Iass ac)ine
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1969) is a carefyil and revealing evaluation of the
NESDE3C formula. But his simulations,unlike those to
be reported here, did not take accurate account of how
local school districts would respond. Instead, he
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increcase or decrease in state aid under a hypothetical
formula would be divided 50-50 by the local school
board between reducing local taxes and increasing the
level of spending on schools. (p. 74)
See also Steven J. Weiss; Existing Disparities in
Public School Finance and ProposI JS 10o RCN i
46, Feb. 1970. 1his is a lucid description of the
state aid probl em in the six New nl>and states.
But the analysis of proposed formul as does not take
account of the local districts' response. (p. 45)
(2) Acts of 1948, Chapter 643.
(3) For a good summary of the federal programs, see
Charles S. Benson: The oEonomics f Public Education
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For an intoresL-ing chronology of the political pro-
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CoimnonweatL of assachusetts; Ph.D. tes is, University
of Connecticut Schooof f Education, 1968.
(5) For further documentation, see Weiss, op. cit. Also
David K. Cohen and Tyll R. van Geel : "Public Educa-
tion"; in Samuel HI. Beer and Richard E. Barringer
(eds.): The State and the Poor; Winthrop Publishers,
1970.
(6) See John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, and StephenD. Sugarman : Private Wealth and Publi c Education;
Harvard Univers.it Press, 1970.
CHAPTER VI
TOWARD A THEORY OF SUBSIDIES
After analyzing various actual and hypothetical state
aid programs, the question naturally arises: What would
be the best state aid formula? This chapter contains
some thoughts on how the simulation model could be used to
answer this question, as part of either the political
process or a programming algorithm. Some of these ideas
would be applicable to other subsidy p)rograms which are
formally similar to state school aid, such as revenue sharing,
income maintenance, foreign aid, or housing allowances.
Therefore some of the discussion wil be in terms of sub-
sidies in general.
One way to use a simulation model to find the best
subs idy forimula would be to simulate the effects of a range
of possible programs , t aking into account the response of
the recipients of subsidies, and then let publ.i c discussion
and the political process choose the best formula. This
procedure could be called pragmatic, democratic, or radical.
It differs from the present method of legislatures develop-
ing subsidy programs in conjunction with experts, lobby
groups, and bureaucrats. In the present legislative process,
subsidy formulas are ostensibly judged by their intrinsic
merits. Although these judgments rely implicitly on some
notion of the expected outcome , this expectation seldom
is made explicit, and hardly ever includes systemaiic
prediction of how the recipients would respond to the
subsidies. Therefore public discussion of distribution and
taxation tends to become confusing and doctrinarie. Use
of systematic simulation models to predict actual outcomes
could clarify the debate by letting people know what they
really stand to gain or lose.
A simulation model could also be used in searching
for the optimal formula by the more elitist method of
mathematical programming . This procedure requi.res a state -
ment of objectives for the subsidy scheme. The following
is a list of objectives for subsidy programs in general.
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even if measurable, would reflect tastes which depend on
the existing distribution of resources. If redistribution
is another important objective of the subsidy program, it
would be inconsistent to make the amount of subsidy depend
on the initial distribution.
For these reasons, the best approach for tJhe donors
of susidies may be to satisfice, by setting some target
level of overall or average consumption or production.
Then a subsidy formula could be chosen to minimize the cost
to the donor of reaching the target.
Equali zation
This is another essential aim of many subsidy programs,
but Chapter II showed how difficult is to define exactly
what eualizati on means It is not always a simple matter
of reducing the variance in the amount consumed or received.
Incidence over income or wealth classes may also be
important. For example, to comply with court: rulings
state school aid will have to reduce the correlation be-
tween expendi ture and wealth.
Equalization tends to conflict with stimulation.
In the context of income maintenance programs, this conflict
creates th.e well-known tradeoff between equality in the
distribution of income and the total level of income or
output, since income transfers may interfere with the
incentive to work for both donors and recipients. In housing
programs, those which subsidize producers may stimulate
more housing production, but grants to consumers in the
WA.
form of housing allowances tend to be more equalizing.
As a final example, in distributing a given amount of state
aid to local school districts, any money allotted to
stimulating expenditures in wealthy districts will only
exacerbate the inequality of expenditure between rich and
poor districts.
Substi tulion?
Subsidy programs are sometimes advocated as a way of
substituting the donor's resources for the recipient 's.
This is especially true in intergovernmental grant pro-
grams, where state and federal tax revenues to some extent
substitute for local taxes . Thus revenue sharing and even
state aid to schools have been sold to the voters as methods
to relieve local pyoperty taxes. Indeed, one reason for
the "fiscal crisis" in local public schools may be that the
voters feel the local school boards have not been passing
enough state aid back in the form of lower taxes, but have
been using it instead to expand programs or raise salaries.
Substi tution and stimulation are inevitably antithe-
tical. To the extent that grants are substituted for the
recipient's own resources, they cannot possibly stimulate
consumption of the desired good. Since stimulation is
the most important purposc of subsidies, some other me-
thod must be found to bring about substitution. For
example, since the chief purpose of state school aid is
to stimulate school spending, the goal of substituting
sales and income for property tax revenues shoul-d be
accomplished by some other means , such as by emrowering
school districts to levy local surcharges on income and
sales taxes. As another example, to the extent that
housing allowances augment family disposable income by
substituting grants for the family's own expenditure on
housing, they fail to achieve their main objective of
stimulating the consumption of housing; so the substitution
objective should be accomplished by some other means, such
as income transfers.
Consumer SOvereig1enty
Thi s is a general criterion for economic efficiency,
which in the context of subsidy programs is related to
accountability and responsiveness. Accountabi ity i ipl lies
first of all , that resources should actually go to the people
for whom they are ostensibly designated. This has been a
real problem in admin.i storing Title I grants for compensa-
tory education. (3) Secondly, consumer sovereignty implies
that the recipients should have maximum leeway in getting
what thev want for their money.
The problem here is that consumer sovereignty may
conflict with both equalization and stimulation. The best
way to promote consumer sovereignty is to give out block
grants directly to consumers. Stimulation would be better
served by subsidies to producers or by giving consumers
grants only with categorical limitations, matching require-
ments, and other strings attached. And equalization implies
even more constraints, to prevent or discourage unequalizing
behavior at either end of the distribution.
Keeping Factor Costs Down
In programs which subsidize particular goods like
housing, education, or medical care, a big danger is that
the extra resources provided by grants will be siphoned
off on the supply side. Competition among producers of
course is the best preventative. But if ensuring competi-
tion requires strict regulation it m..ay interfere with
consumer sovereignty. And in general, any subsidy program
which attempts to stimul-ate an industry operating near
capacity will raise the iprice of scarce factors.
Exactly how to work these various objectives into an
optimi zation problem is not self-evident. One of them
could be taken as the optimand, and the rest treated
as constraints. Or a scalar optimand could be constructed
by weighting two or more objectives.
In the specific case of state aid to local school
districts, the problem could be stated as follows : Within
the class of acceptable equalizing formulas, find the one
that minimizes the cost to the state, subject to the con-
straint that no district spends less than some minimum
amount per pupil. This statement of the problem woul d
seem to rule out state assumption of all school costs,
unless the class of acceptable equalizing formulas were
so small as to require virtually the same expendi ture per
pupil in every district, or unless full state assumption
were required for some other reason, such as keeping factor
costs down. But suppose instead that the class of permissible
formulas were broad enough to include power equalizing,
where total expenditure per pupil g (L) depends only on the
local school tax rate t:
6.1 g(L) = h(t).
L is current expendi ture per pupil from local revenues,
and t is the local school tax rate:
6.2 t = L/B,
where B is a measure of the local tax base. Now suppose
that the frontier is described by the two parameters,
A and k:
6.3 h(t) = A + kt.
The procedure for finding the best formula now consists
in searching along the minimum-expendi ture constraint for
the least costly formIula. Start by setting A and k at some
reasonable level, then using an estimated behavi oral
equation like 4.16, with c := k/B and c 2 = qA, to find
the resulting di stribution of per pupil expenditure. Next
identify the lowest-spending district in this distribu-
tion. Then set the minimum level of total expenditure per
pupil, E, equal to the amount predicted by the behavioral
equation for the lowest-spending district for any values of
A and k:
6.4 E = A + k(L/B)
k pn - qA + MA + - ( ) .
B k + p2 /kn 2
Here the bars over symbols denote data for the lowest-
spending district. Equation 6.4, which relates the two
unknowns A and k, is therefore the minimum expenditure
constraint.
To find the particular combination of A and k that would
minimize the cost to the state, it would be reasonable to
begin with A 0, and k determined by 6.4. The reason is
that in general matching grants are more stimulating thn
block grants. If there were a value of k that satisfied
6.4 with A = 0, then this inself might be the optimal
formul a. If setting A = 0 would not be feasible, then it
would be necessary to find the smallest value of A that would
yield a solution to 6.4 .
To check whether the combination of A and k derived
in this fashion would indeed be optimal, the predicted
expenditure per pupil in each district would have to be
computed by means of 4.1-6. It is possible that after
changing A and k some other district woculd become the
least- spending district, in which case equat i on 6.4 would
have to be rewritten using the data for this new lowest-
expenditure district. Then a new combination of A and k
would have to be found from the new equation 6.4.
Finally, it is of course necessary to compute explicitly
the cost to the state resulting from the chosen combinatina
of A. and k. This is simply the sum over all districts of the
per pupil subsidy times the number of pupils N:
6.5 (A + kLi/B. - L )Ni
A coarse grid search over the range of A and k, in addition
to a finer search in the neighborhood of the chosen combination,
would chock that this combi nation of A and k really did
minimize the cost to the state.
To find the cost-mLnimizing formula among more complicat-
ed classes of equalizing grants would be more difficult,
but not impossible. For example, it would be possible to
consider the class of power-equali zing formulas that
create a linear but kinked frontier:
6.6 h(t) = (1 d 1 )k t + d[kit* + k2(t - t*)],
where 0 for tg t*
d 
=
1 for t> t* .
This would produce a frontier with a slope equal to k
up to t* , and k 2 beyond that. Simulation of the local
response to this is complicated because iterati on may be
required to find the correct value of d in each district.
Another possible class of formulas would be like 6.3,
but A and k would be fuinctions of the tax base Bi.
Conclusions
Models which predict how subsidies will change the
economic behavior of the recipients can be used to find the
best subsidy formiula, in two way's. One way would be to
simulate the effects of alternative subsidy programs, and
introduce the results directly into public discussion.
The second appraoch would be to formulate an optimization
problem, to find the formula that could best achieve the
goals of stimulation, equalization, consumer sovercignty,
and keeping factor costs down.
Two warnings are in order here, though. First, no
subsidy formula, no matter how carefully designed and
tloroughly discussed, will be perfect. Any program will
need to adapDt as experience grows and situations change.
Adaptability should therefore be bui lt right into the
pro gram. This could be done by writing provisions into
statutes and regulations which call for changes in the form
or parameters of the grant program in the event that the
results are unsatisfactory. Ideally, there might even be
some kind of automati c "citizen feedback," so that public
opinion would mon itor the prog; ram continuously or periodi-
c ally.
The second warning is that the analysis of subsidy
programs should never distract attention from the constraints
imposed by the structure of the system. An "optimal"
program is optimal only within these constraints, and some-
times the best may not be very good. For example, an
"optimal" income maintenance program that is constrained to
preserve markets in labor and the hierarchy of jobs may not
provide adequate income maintenance at all. If this is
true, our efforts may be better spent in trying to relax the
systemic constraints than in mak ing marginal improvements.
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section, the amount of state tax as- not entitled to reimbursement provided
sessed to the own, under St.1921, cc. to "public day schools". 5 Op.Atty.Gen.
399 and 402, was not paid within the re- 1920, p. 580.
quired time, - interest assessed as pro- Cities and towns conducting schools
vided by the statute cannot be abated. for American citizenship are not entitled
6 Op.Atty.Gen.1922, p. 39. to additional reimbursement on account
Cities and towns maintaining contin- of salaries paid to teachers in such
uation schools for employed minors are schools. 5 Op.Atty.Gen.1920, p. 573.
§ 2. Definitions
When used in this chapter the following words shall, unless the
context requires otherwise, have the following meanings:-
(a) "Equalized valuation", the equalized valuation of the aggre-
gate property in a city or town subject to local taxation, as most re-
cently reported by the state tax commission to the general court un-
der the provisions of section ten C of chapter fifty-eight.
(b) "Public school", any school or class under the control of a
school committee, regional district school committee, local trustees of
vocational education or district trustees of vocational education.
(c) "Reimbursable expenditures", the total amount expended
by a city or town during a fiscal year for the support of public
schools during said year exclusive of expenditures for transportation,
for school lunch programs, for special classes for the physically hand-
icapped and the mentally retarded, for programs of vocational educa-
tion as provided in chapter seventy-four and for capital outlays, after
deducting therefrom any receipts for tuition, receipts from the fi4.
eral government, the proceeds of any invested funds, and grants, gifts
and receipts from any other source, to the extent that such receipts
are applicable to such expenditures. The commissioner of education
may, by regulation, further define the expenditures and receipts that
may be included hereunder.
(d) "School aid percentage", for each city or town, the amount
by which one hundred per cent exceeds the product, to the nearest
tenth of one per cent, of sixty-five per cent times the valuation per-
centage; provided that, in applying the school aid formula under sec-
tion four, the maximum percentage of state support shall be seventy-
five per cent and the minimum shall be fifteen per cent.
(e) "School attending child", any minor child in any school,
kindergarten through grade twelve, resident in the city or town, as
reported by the superintendent of schools in accordance with the re-
quirements of section two A of chapter seventy-two.
(f) "Valuation percentage", the proportion, to the nearest tenth
of one per cent, which the equalized valuation per school attending
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child of the city or town bears to the average equalized valuation per
school attending child for the entire state.
Added by St.1966, c. 14,. § 40. Amended by St.1967, c. 791, § 1.
Historical Note
St.1967, c. 791, § 1, approved Dec. 18,
1967, inserted, in the first sentence of
par. (c), "for programs of vocational ed-
ucation as provided in chapter seventy-
four."
This section contains subject matter
similar to that of former sections 7 and
8 of this chapter. -1
Prior Laws:
St.1948, c. 643, § 1.
-r
§ 3. Massachusetts school fund
The present school fund of the commonwealth, known as4 the
Massachusetts School Fund, with future additions, shall continue to
constitute a permanent fund. The commissioner of education and the
state treasurer shall continue to be commissioners to invest and man-
age said fund, and they shall report annually the condition and in-
come thereof. All investments shall be made with the approval of
the governor and council. The annual income thereof shall be credit-
ed to the Local Aid Fund and shall be paid to the several cities and
towns, under the provisions of section eighteen A of chapter fifty-
eight, as part of the school aid required under this chapter.
Added by St.1966, c. 14, § 40.
Historical Note
This section contains provisions simi-
lar to those of former section 2 of this
chapter.
Prior Laws:
St.1948, c. 643, § 1.
Cross References
State treasurer authorized to invest and reinvest funds, see c. 10, § 16.
Notes of Decisions
1. In general
Treasurer of commonwealth is not au-
thorized to distribute funds pursuant to
this section, unless and until commis-
sioner of education informs him, or a
court of competent jurisdiction rules
that reports required under c. 72 had
been filed with the commissioner's office
in accordance with applicable provi-
sions. Op.Atty.Gen. April 29, 1965, p.
269.
Failure of a school committee of a
town to prosecute a parent for not send-
ing his child to school is not a failure
on part of town to comply with laws re-
lating to truancy, and commissioners of
Massachusetts School Fund have no au'-
thority to withhold from the town itS
share of said fund on that account. 1
Op.Atty.Gen.1898, p. 517.
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§ 4. Payments; determination of amounts
The school aid to be paid to each city and town in any calendar
year shall be the amount obtained by multiplying its reimbursable ex-
penditures for the last preceding fiscal year by its school aid percent-
age for the calendar year during which such fiscal year begins; pro-
vided, that in determining the amount of such aid the school aid per-
centage shall not be applied to any portion of reimbursable expendi-
tures above an amount equal to one hundred and ten per cent of the
average reimbursable expenditures per child in net average member-
ship for the state multiplied by the total number of children in net
average membership in such city or town; and further provided, that -t
in the case of any city or town whose reimbursable expenditure's per
child in net average membership shall fall below eighty per cent of
the state average of such expenditures, the school aid percentage
shall be applied to a figure which is equivalent to eighty per cent of
the state average reimbursable expenditures per child in net average
membership, provided, however, that the amount received by any
such city or town as reimbursement on account of the provisions of
this section together with any amounts received from the federal gov-
ernment for expenditures for reimbursable purposes during the pre-
vious fiscal year shall not exceed seventy-five per cent of the sum of
its reimbursable expenditures as defined in this chapter and such
amounts received from the federal government; nor shall the amount
of said aid be less than one hundred and fifteen per cent of the amounts,,
paid by the commonwealth to each city or town in nineteen hundred
and sixty-five as school aid under this chapter, plus any grants and
reimbursements paid in such year under provisions of chapters sixty-
nine, seventy-one and seventy-four which are thereafter terminated.
In determining the amounts paid by the commonwealth in nineteen
hundred and sixty-five, amounts paid to regional school districts shall
be deemed to have been received by each city or town in such district
in the same proportion as the expenditures of such district which it is
required to pay bear to the total expenditures of such district.
Added by St.1966, c. 14, § 40.
Historical Note
This section contains subject matter St.1951, c. 592, § 1.
similar to that of former sections 3, 3B, St.1953, c. 547, §§ 1, 2.
4, 4A, 5 and 6 of this chapter. St.1956, c. 453.
St.1956, c. 599, 2.
Prior Laws:
St.1948, c. 643, § 1.
St.1950, c. 774.
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